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4.1  Introduction 
Two factors motivate the choice of  commercial aircraft as the first case 
study of the techniques proposed in chapter 2. First, throughout the postwar 
era,  and  particularly  between  1958 and  1972,  profound  quality  changes 
occurred  in  both  performance  characteristics and  operating  efficiency  of 
commercial aircraft. Second, a wealth of data is available on all aspects of the 
airline industry, as a result of  its history of  federal government regulation. 
The  U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board  (CAB) continued to  collect  the  same 
continuous  data  base  both  before  and  after  the  passage  of  the  airline 
deregulation act in late 1978, at least through the “sunset”  of the CAB at the 
end of  1984, allowing the study in this chapter to cover the years 1947-83.’ 
Among  the  relevant  CAB  data  are  the  prices  paid  by  airlines  for  each 
individual aircraft,  and  numerous details on  operating costs and revenue- 
generating ability for each aircraft type. 
The commercial airframe and aircraft engine manufacturers provide a case 
study of what was called in chapter 2 nonproportional quality change. With 
only a few exceptions, most new aircraft models introduced since 1958 have, 
in comparison with the preceding model, provided a percentage increase in 
net revenue exceeding the percentage increase in price. During the heyday of 
the transition from piston to jet aircraft, from  1958 to  1972, the relatively 
small extra price charged by  aircraft manufacturers for new models resulted 
in the transfer of benefits from performance and efficiency gains to airlines 
I. Much of the data base relevant for this study has been maintained since the demise of  the 
CAB  in  the  aviation  public  reference  room  at  the  U.S. Department  of  Transportation. In 
particular, a complete record is maintained of purchase prices of aircraft and aircraft engines and 
operating costs by  airline and aircraft type, allowing the  study reported in this chapter to  be 
updated by  future investigators. 
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and ultimately to airline customers in the form of  a declining real price of 
airline transportation. 
There can be no doubt in the case of the aircraft industry that changes in 
operating efficiency are viewed, along with changes in performance charac- 
teristics, as relevant dimensions of  quality change. In  1982, fuel expenses 
represented between 38  and 57  percent of  total  operating expense for the 
fourteen major aircraft types operated by  the domestic trunk airline industry 
(U.S. CAB, Aircraft  Operating Cost and Performance Report, July  1983). 
Aircraft purchase decisions have involved trade-offs, widely discussed in the 
trade press,  among price,  performance,  and  operating efficiency.  Airlines 
have been observed to incur substantial capital costs in order to replace one 
type of plane by  another having no greater speed or carrying capacity, just to 
gain an improvement in operating efficiency. 
The  study in  this  chapter and  that  of  electric generating equipment in 
chapter 5 are intended to provide examples of  practical methods for imple- 
menting the rather general and abstract measurement framework outlined in 
chapter 2. The basic formula for quality adjustment (eq. [2.35]) requires the 
comparison of  the observed change in the price of  a new  model with  the 
extra net  revenue  that  the  new  model provides relative to the  old  model, 
holding constant the prices of  output and operating inputs. Because data on 
changes in net revenue are required, the airline and utility industries are ideal 
testing  grounds  for  the  methodology,  since  the  government  requires  the 
publication of  detailed information on operating costs of  specific units  of 
capital equipment. Changes in operating efficiency have been important for 
some other products,  for example,  automobiles and consumer appliances. 
While data on operating costs are available, there is no direct measure of 
“net  revenue,”  and a different approach to quality measurement must  be 
adopted. 
The quality corrections suggested in this chapter are large in magnitude 
and primarily  reflect the effect of  jet  technology  in  raising the  ability of 
commercial aircraft to generate net revenue. Turbine engines produce greater 
thrust and faster speeds and have resulted in a quantum decline in the “real” 
unit costs of crew salaries, fuel cost, and maintenance. Crew costs declined, 
because  jet  aircraft  produce  many  more  seat  miles  per  crew  hour,  and 
maintenance expenses declined,  because jet  aircraft  typically  fly  at  least 
twice  as  long  between  overhauls as  piston engines,  and  failures between 
overhauls have become much less frequent (Straszheim 1969, 84). Decreased 
maintenance requirements have increased feasible daily aircraft utilization, 
although  the  estimates  in  this  chapter  err  on  the  conservative  side  in 
calculating quality  adjustments by  attributing to  piston  aircraft  the  daily 
utilization achieved by jet aircraft in the mid- 1960s. 
The  new  estimates  understate  the  “true”  extent  of  quality  change  in 
another much more important way, and this is the choice of an  aircraft seat 
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period. This ignores the value of  time savings to passengers due to the fact 
that the introduction of  the jet  aircraft cut travel times roughly  in  half  on 
given  routes  and  made  possible  longer  stage  lengths  that  reduced  the 
necessity for making intermediate stops. Less tangible dimensions of quality 
improvement,  for  example,  elimination  of  piston-engine  vibration,  the 
ability of jet aircraft to fly above thunderstorms and reduce the incidence of 
turbulence, and the improved safety record of jet aircraft, are also ignored. 
But these additional aspects of  quality change can serve as a counterweight 
to those who may find the large size of the basic quality adjustments difficult 
to believe. 
The approach outlined in  chapter 2 calls for a price index for identical 
models to be multiplied by  a quality adjustment factor based on changes in 
net revenue relative to changes in aircraft purchase prices. The first step is 
the development of  a price index for identical aircraft. Next  are provided 
estimates of  gross  revenue,  operating costs,  and net  revenue for pairs  of 
aircraft.  These  pairs  are  new  models  and  the  old  models  they  typically 
replaced  on  routes  of  approximately the  same  stage  length  (long  haul, 
medium haul, and short haul). The resulting “adjacent model”  net revenue 
ratios are  then  compared  with  purchase price ratios.  The last  step in  the 
analysis is an  examination of  cross-model ratios of  used  aircraft prices at 
different points  in  time,  intended to  provide  a check  on  the  quantitative 
magnitude of  the estimated cross-model quality differentials. The resulting 
used  aircraft  price  ratios  can  be  converted  into  a  price  index,  and  this 
confirms the previous suggestion that the net revenue method yields quality 
adjustments that are too conservative. 
4.2  Postwar Performance of the Airline Industry 
As a preliminary to the subsequent investigation, table 4.1 displays data 
on  the  postwar  performance  of  the  airline  industry,  exhibited  as  annual 
average growth rates over five-year intervals. The first three rows identify a 
sharp break in the relation between employment cost and productivity before 
and  after  1972. In  the  twenty-five  years before  1972, the average annual 
increase in employee compensation was 6.3 percent and that of productivity 
was  7.9 percent, so that unit  labor cost declined by  1.6 percent per year. 
After  1972, however, productivity growth virtually ceased,  indicating that 
the airline industry made its own contribution to the post-1972 “puzzle”  of 
a productivity growth slowdown for the U.S. economy as a whole. Without 
productivity  growth,  most  of  the  rapid  post-1972  growth  in  employee 
compensation flowed down to row  3 to become a  relatively rapid  rate  of 
increase in unit labor cost. 
Shown in row 4 is the soaring cost of  aircraft fuel resulting from the two 
OPEC “shocks”  of  1973-74  and  1979-80.  This followed a much slower 
annual increase in fuel cost of  only  1.7 percent per year during  1947-72. 114  Chapter Four 
Table 4.1  Airline Fares, Costs, and Productivity, Annual Growth Rates for Five-Year 
Intervals,  1947-82 
1947-  1952-  1957-  1962-  1967-  1972-  1977-  1947- 
52  57  62  67  72  77  82  82 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
1. Compensation per 
FTE employee 
2.  Output per mE 
employee 
3.  Unit labor cost 
4.  Fuel cost per 
gallon 
5. Average operating 
cost 
6.  Average 
passenger yield 
7. BEA index of 
equipment cost 
8.  GNP deflator 
9.  Real average cost 
10.  Real average 
11.  Real equipment 
yield 
cost 
1.95  4.41  5.09  4.66  9.54  8.97  8.31  6.99 
9.67  8.05  5.47  6.68  9.76  0.45  1.31  5.91 










8.52  7.00  1.09 
24.36  22.92  7.52 
-  I .83  -1.44  I .02  -2.36  1.15  7.85  10.53  2.13 
5.99  7.54  2.52  1.87  -1.07  3.88  -2.83  2.29 
5.82  4.26  I .97  1.92  3.80  8.76  10.24  5.25 
3.18 
-5.01 
-  1.31 
2.34 
-3.78 








-  3.65 
-2.51 
6.96  8.12  4.20 
0.89  2.41  -2.07 
-0.97  -0.58  -1.68 
2.64  1.92  0.30  -0.38  -  1.00  1.80  2.12  1.05 
Sources by row: (1, 2) Compensation,  from NIPA, table 6.5A. row 43. Full-time equivalent employees (FTE), table 
6.8A, row 43. Output is measured by  available seat miles for the domestic industry (trunkline and local service), from 
Bailey, Graham, and  Kaplan  (1983,  apps.  A and  B). (3) Row  1 minus  row  2.  (4)  1965-82:  U.S.CAB, Aircruft 
Operating Cost and Perjormance Report,various issues, price paid for jet fuel for all carriers operating narrow-bodied 
four-engine jet aircraft.  1947-65:  PPI for refined petroleum products (index 07-5).  (5,  6)  Bailey,Graham, and Kaplan 
(1983, app. A). (7) This chapter, table 4.3, col. 3. (8) NIPA, table 7.  I  (9) Row 5 minus row 8.  (10) Row 6 minus row 
8.  (11) Row 7 minus row 8. 
Average operating cost per available seat mile in row 5 shows an acceleration 
corresponding  to  that  in  labor  and  fuel  cost,  from  an  average  of  -0.7 
percent  per year  in  1947-72  to 9.2 percent  per year  in  1972-82.  Average 
yield  growth accelerated less than growth in average cost,  from 0.8 to 6.8 
percent  per  year,  providing  an  explanation  of  the  sharp  drop  in  operating 
profit margins (which were  -5.9  percent in  1947, 5.8 percent  in  1972, and 
-4.5  percent  in  1982; Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan 1985, app. A).2 
Equipment cost also displayed a post- 1972 acceleration, although this was 
less marked than for operating cost, from an average in row 7 of 3.6 percent 
per  year  in  1947-72  to  9.5 percent  in  1972-82.  This  acceleration  was 
slightly sharper than for the GNP deflator (2.9-7.5  percent). It is interesting 
to compare the increase in equipment cost in row 7 with compensation per 
employee  in  row  1, in  an  attempt  to determine  indirectly  the  behavior  of 
productivity  growth in the aircraft manufacturing industry.  This comparison 
is  meaningful  only  on  the  assumption  that  employee  compensation  in  the 
2. The 1982 figure is for the twelve months ending 30 June. 115  Commercial Aircraft 
aircraft  manufacturing  industry  increased  at  about  the  same rate  as in the 
airline industry (there is no separate BEA index for average compensation or 
productivity in the aircraft manufacturing industry, which is lumped together 
with automobiles and other components of  “transportation  equipment”).  If 
profit margins  were roughly constant, then differences between the growth 
rates  of  employment  cost  and  the  prices  of  aircraft  provide  an  indirect 
measure  of  productivity  growth  in  aircraft  manufacturing.  This difference 
was 2.7 percent  for 1947-72  and  -0.9  percent  for 1972-82,  an indirect 
comparison that would seem to indicate that, after 1972, productivity growth 
in the aircraft manufacturing industry was somewhat less rapid than in U.S. 
manufacturing as a whole. This conclusion is consistent with the increase in 
the real cost of  aircraft relative to the GNP deflator displayed in row 11. 
The figures displayed in table 4.1 raise a question about the sources of the 
rapid productivity  growth in the airline industry achieved prior to  1972, as 
displayed  in  row  2,  and  the  reason  for the  sharp post-1972 productivity 
growth slowdown. This experience was much more severe than for the U.S. 
economy  as a  whole,  since  productivity  grew  much  more  rapidly  in  the 
airline industry  than  in  the  rest  of  the  economy prior  to  1972, but  more 
slowly thereafter. One possible explanation of rapid productivity growth in a 
particular industry or sector of the economy might be a decline in the cost of 
capital equipment at a rate greater than for the economy as a whole, inducing 
through substitution a greater rate of increase in real capital input than in the 
rest of the economy. However,  this explanation does not appear promising 
for the  airline  industry,  in  view  of  the  increasing  real  cost  of  equipment 
during the period of rapid productivity  growth between  1947 and  1962, as 
shown in row  11. 
A working hypothesis to be investigated in this chapter is that the official 
price  index  for  equipment  cost  is  incorrect,  and  that  the  true  price  of 
equipment decreased rapidly before 1972 in real terms, motivating airlines to 
purchase equipment and substitute away from labor and fuel toward capital. 
If  this decline in the real  price  of  equipment ended around  1972, at  least 
some part of  the productivity  growth slowdown might be explained as the 
result of a lower incentive to substitute capital for labor. One possible reason 
for the official price index to have been more accurate after 1972 than before 
could  have been  a decrease  in  the  importance  of  nonproportional  quality 
change. 
4.3  Index of Sale Prices of Identical Models 
The existing national income accounts deflator for the aircraft category of 
purchases of producers’  durable equipment,  shown on row 7 of  table 4.1, 
has been compiled by  the CAB’S Financial  and Cost Analysis Division for 
the years since 1957. Airlines report purchases and retirements regularly for 
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CAB’S  Form 41 (Schedule B-7) by their month of acquisition and type (e.g., 
Boeing  707-331B), the  CAB  has  been  able  to construct an  aircraft  price 
index by measuring the year-to-year change in the unit price for each type of 
equipment delivered  in  both of  two adjacent years. Because only identical 
pieces of equipment are compared in adjacent years, the index ignores any 
“true”  price  change  involved  in  the  transition  from  one aircraft  type  to 
another.  As  an  example,  the  substantial  price  reduction  involved  in  the 
switch by Douglas in 1958-59  from the manufacture of the DC-7 to that of 
the DC-8 is simply ignored, and the price index for the year of transition is 
based only on price changes for planes that were manufactured  in both the 
adjacent years. The CAB index, shown in column 3 of table 4.4, begins in 
1957 and increases from 1957 to 1983 by 270 percent, somewhat more than 
the 232 percent increase in the GNP deflat~r.~ 
Even viewed on its own terms as a price index for identical models, the 
CAB index has weaknesses. First, its criterion of identical quality is that any 
aircraft with the same model number retains the same quality, no matter how 
long  it  remains  in  production:  “The  fundamental  assumption  is that  any 
significant change in specifications for new equipment results in a change in 
the type or model number of the equipment as reported on CAB Form 41” 
(U.S. CAB  1977,  1).  However,  as we shall  see below,  significant quality 
improvements were made over the production lifetime of some major types 
of jet aircraft, for example, the Boeing 727-200. The second problem is that 
the CAB  index measures price changes between adjacent years for a given 
model, without any attention to  which airlines were purchasing that model. 
As  we  shall  see, different  airlines  pay  quite  different  prices  for  a  given 
model  in the  same year,  so that  the  price  change measured  by  the  CAB 
combines true price change with mix effects, as the weight of airlines paying 
relatively  high  and  low  price changes.  A  third  problem,  the fact that  the 
CAB  index  extends  back  only  to  1957  and  leaves  the  1947-57  decade 
uncovered, is sufficient to warrant an effort to construct an alternative price 
index  for  identical  aircraft.  However,  in  the  process  of  constructing  the 
alternative  index,  sufficient  information  has  been  gathered  to  allow  an 
assessment of the first two problems as well. 
Our index is based on unit prices of  commercial aircraft, obtained  from 
the same source as the CAB index, that is, CAB  Form 41. To  save time in 
copying the data, there was no attempt to look up the initial report of each 
aircraft  purchase  on  Schedule  B-7,  since an inspection  of  forty of  these 
quarterly forms would have been required just to cover a single airline for a 
single decade. Instead, the source of  the price data is schedule B-43, which 
lists  the  complete inventory  of  aircraft  owned  by  each  airline at the  end 
of  each  year,  and  shows  acquisition  year,  serial  number,  historical  cost, 
3. The CAB index is extrapolated before  1957 by weighting together several components of 
the PPI unrelated to aircraft manufacture, including diesel engines and fabricated metal parts. 117  Commercial Aircraft 
and  number  of  seats.  Because  aircraft  engines  are  not  listed  separately 
for each airframe and  are not dated by  acquisition year,  the  index covers 
only airframes. This should not be a major handicap, since aircraft engines 
have  rather  continuously represented roughly  one-quarter of  the  value  of 
the  associated  airframe.  The  forms  used  were  those  for  1961 (covering 
1947-61),  1967  (covering  1961  -67),  1973  (covering  1967-73),  1978 
(covering  1973-78),  1982  (covering  1978-82),  and  1983  (covering 
Like the  CAB  index,  the  new  index excludes leased  aircraft and  used 
aircraft. Another similarity is that only the domestic trunklines are covered, 
and local service carriers are e~cluded.~  Coverage is also similar, with the 
new index having slightly greater coverage in 1958-67,  and the CAB index 
having greater coverage in 1968-76.5 
1982- 83). 
Coverage as Percentage of  Value of  Aircraft 
Purchased by Domestic Trunk Carriers 
CAB Index  Table 4.2, Column 4 
1958 -  67  47.9 
1968-76  70.4 
51.6 
58.2 
The criterion for coverage is  to  include the  seven largest domestic trunk 
carriers,  American,  Delta,  Eastern,  Northwest,  Pan  American, TWA,  and 
United. 
A basic decision in constructing a price index from the available data is 
whether to treat as identical all aircraft bearing the same model number or 
only aircraft of a given model number purchased by  a given airline. In what 
follows, two indexes are developed, respectively dubbed the ‘‘same model” 
(SM)  index  and  the  “same  model  same  airline”  (SMSA)  index.  The 
importance of this distinction becomes evident in an examination of the raw 
data,  which  show,  for  instance,  that  in  1952 Pan  American  paid  $1.27 
million  each  for  twelve DC-~BS,  almost 50  percent  more  than  United’s 
purchase price  of  $0.86 million  each  for  eleven aircraft.  A  more  recent 
example is Delta’s purchase of five 727-200 aircraft in  1981 at an average 
price  of  $12.0  million,  one-third more  than  American’s  purchase of  ten 
727-200 aircraft in the same year at an average price of $8.9 million. These 
discrepancies  in  purchase  price  reflect  some  unknown  combination  of 
4. The CAB  index for  1957-76,  which is described in  U.S. CAB  (1977), covers only the 
domestic trunkline industry. Since then, airlines have been reclassified as “major,”  “national,” 
and  “regional,” and in recent years the CAB index has included the first two categories. 
5. The  source for coverage of the CAI3 index is U.S. CAB  (1977, table 2).  My coverage is 
calculated as half the  value listed in table 4.2, col. 2, divided by the total of aircraft acquired as 
listed in the same CAB  table. 118  Chapter Four 
differing features and  options on the  aircraft itself,  and  differing contract 
terms  (in the  1979-81  period,  Delta’s purchase price for 727-200 aircraft 
increased each year, indicating an escalated contract,  while American man- 
aged to escape escalation). 
The distinction between the two types of indexes can be illustrated with a 
simple numerical example illustrating the evolution of aircraft prices over a 
four-year period: 
Year  1  Year 2  Year 3  Year 4 
Model  1, airline  1  1 @ $1.00  10 @ $1.00  10  @ $1.00  1 @ $1.00 
Model 2, airline 1  5 @ $1.00  ...  8 @ $1.21  5 @ $1.32 
Model 2, airline 2  ...  I @ $1.32  ...  10 @ $1.58 
Here, we have model 1, which is sold at the same price to airline 1 in each 
year. In the early years of jet aircraft, it was common for airlines to receive 
aircraft over a number of years on a single fixed-price contract, for example, 
purchases by Eastern, United, and American of Boeing 727-100 aircraft at a 
single price for each airline extending over the five-year period 1963-67.  As 
for model  2, its price is assumed to increase at  10  percent per year. It is 
purchased by  airline  2  only  in  years  2  and  4,  while  airline  1 does  not 
purchase model 2 in year 2. Also, airline 2 for some reason pays 20 percent 
more for model 2 than does airline 1. 
The CAB index is constructed for adjacent year pairs by using second-year 
quantity weights to construct a ratio of revenue in each year: 
(4.1) 
The price index that links together the R, ratios is 
(4.2) 
Just  as  the  CAB  index  treats  as  a  single  homogeneous  commodity  any 
aircraft bearing a given model designation, regardless of which airline has 
done  the  purchasing,  so  we  can  construct  an  analogous  SM  index,  and 
contrast it with an SMSA index. The alternative SM index differs from the 
CAB  index  only  in  the  index  number  formula,  which  is  based  on  the 
Tornqvist approach that applies value weights or logarithmic changes. The 
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where  Vfi = P,Q,.  The price index that links together these adjacent year 
changes is 
The SMSA index is calculated with (4.3) and (4.4), differing only in that the 
index in (4.3) refers to a given model for a given airline, rather than a given 
model purchased by  all airlines. 
The difficulty in developing the SMSA index, which treats a given model 
purchased by  different airlines as  a different commodity, is evident in the 
numerical example. This more demanding criterion of quality homogeneity 
results in a drastic reduction in the sample of observations available, since no 
single airline purchased model 2 in adjacent year pairs 1 and 2 or 2 and 3. A 
straightforward calculation  of  the  SMSA  index  would  give  a  misleading 
result, since it would place no weight at all on model 2 in the first two year 
pairs.  By  placing  all  the  weight  on  model  1, the  resulting  SMSA  index 
would yield a zero rate of price change for the first three years, ignoring the 
increasing price of  model 2. 
A  simple solution to this  puzzle  is  to  interpolate  the  observations  for 
purchases of  a given model by  the same airline,  “filling in”  years with no 
purchases  by  interpolating  between  years  when  purchases  were  actually 
made. By  interpolation, we can fill in the values of  $1.10 for model 2 and 
airline 1 in year 2, and $1.45 for model 2 and airline 2 in year 3. The fol- 
lowing  table  shows the  results  of  applying  these  different  index  number 
methods to the example: 
Tornqvist Index 
Year  CAB Method (SM)  SM  SMSA Raw Data  SMSA with Interpolation 
1  100.0  100.0  100.0 
2  122.4  110.8  100.0 
3  107.6  106.3  100.0 





The  SM  indexes,  whether  constructed  by  the  CAB  or  by  the  T6rnqvist 
methods, exhibit a common zigzag pattern, jumping in years 2 and 4 while 
declining in year 3. This is strictly a mix effect and reflects the fact that the 120  Chapter Four 
high-price airline 2 purchased model 2 in years 2 and 4 but not in years  1 
and 3. Another feature of the SM indexes is that the CAB method registers a 
higher rate  of  price  change.  This  results  from  the  formula  (4.1), which 
exaggerates price change by  using the prior year price in the denominator, 
instead of the average of the current and prior year price,which would give a 
closer approximation to the theoretically preferable Tornqvist index formula 
(4.3). 
The three Tornqvist indexes also differ. The column labeled “SMSA Raw 
Data”  registers no price change in years  1 through 3, since it gives a 100 
percent weight to the unchanged price of model  1 and no weight at all to the 
rising price of model 2. This occurs because there is no available comparison 
for model 2 in adjacent year pairs  1  and 2 or 2 and 3, because no single 
airline  purchases  that  model  in  both  those  adjacent  years.  The  column 
labeled  “SMSA  with  Interpolation”  provides the closest approximation to 
“what is really happening,” that is, a steady price for one model and a price 
increasing steadily at roughly 10 percent per year for the second model. The 
rate of change of the interpolated SMSA index is 3.4, 5.8, and 6.0  percent in 
the  three  adjacent  year  pairs,  with  the  differences  reflecting  only  the 
relatively  smaller  number  of  model  2  aircraft  sold  in  year  1. The  only 
apparent defect of  the interpolated SMSA index is an exaggeration of  price 
change, due to the inclusion of interpolated prices (using prior year’s sales as 
weights), which attributes to any model for which interpolated observations 
are used a higher weight than is warranted by  actual sales. 
Table 4.2 displays rates of  price change for the two Tornqvist indexes, 
equivalent to the SM and interpolated SMSA indexes in the above example. 
The SM index treats a single model as a homogeneous commodity, regardless 
of which airline makes the purchase, and registers a price change when there 
is a change in the mix of airlines paying relatively high and low prices for 
the same model. In table 4.2, column 1 shows the total value of purchases in 
each adjacent year pair,  for example,  $2,659 million in  the  1982-83  pair 
(listed by the second year, 1983, in the table). Column 2 displays the ratio of 
the value in column  1 to the total  value of  aircraft purchases in the PDE 
component of the NIPA. Since coverage in the new  SM index and the CAB 
index is similar, the fact that coverage in the new index is in  the  15-25 
percent range must reflect categories of  aircraft that are excluded from both 
the  SM  and the  CAB  indexes,  including aircraft leased by  trunk  carriers, 
aircraft  purchased  or  leased  by  other  airlines,  and  all  general  aviation 
aircraft, as well as the fact that the new data exclude the value of engines 
while  the  PDE  component  of  the  NIPA  includes  them.  Like  the  PDE 
component of  the NIPA,  the new  index  excludes exports  and, at  least in 
principle, includes imports (the only imported aircraft included in the sample 
is the Airbus A-300 during the years 1978-82). 
As in the above example, the interpolated SMSA index treats as a homo- 
geneous commodity a given model purchased by a given airline. Interpolated 121  Commercial Aircraft 
Table 4.2  Weighted Price Changes for Identical Aircraft 
Adjacent-Year Pairs 
Same Model (SM)  Same Model Same Airline (SMSA)  Weighted 
Percentage 
Second  Value of  Percent  Number  Value of  Percent  Change 
Year  Aircraft  of NIPA  of  Aircraft  Value 
of  (.$  million)  Value  Aircraft  ($ million)  Interpolated  SM  SMSA 









































































































































2,659  ... 
597  ... 
9  54  ... 
1,611  ... 
1,608  6 
1,178  9 
545  27 
865  49 
1,236  31 
753  14 
935  ... 
511  18 
1,399  7 
34 1  12 
854  8 
1,337  4 
830  25 
842  48 
496  66 
320  70 
266  58 
653  27 
549  18 
208  ... 
130  ... 
170  5 
125  26 
70  38 
57  19 
75  10 
24  3 
14  47 
23  44 
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Sources by column:  (1,3-7)  US.  CAB, Schedule B-43, 31 December 1961, 1967, 1973, 1978, 1982, and 1983. See 
explanation in text. (2) Column 4 divided by the sum for pairs of adjacent years of private purchases of aircraft, NIPA, 
table 5.6, row 21. 
purchase prices are created when a given airline purchases a given aircraft 
model in  two years separated by  one or more years when  no such aircraft 
were purchased. The price attributed to these purchases is based on a linear 
interpolation of  the prices paid in years when actual purchases were made, 
and  the  weight  attributed  to  these  purchases  was  a  value  equal  to  the 
interpolated prices times the quantity sold in the earlier year. As an example, 122  Chapter Four 
Table 4.3  Ratios to SMSA Value without Interpolation 
SMSA Value with 
SM Value  Interpolation 
(1)  (2) 
1948-51  1.28  I .22 
1958-67  1.30  1.45 
1968-77  1.40  1.19 
1978-83  1.07  1.02 
Source:  Calculated from table 4.2, cols.  1 and 4 
TWA purchased two model 727-200 aircraft in 1969 at $5.0 million each and 
five in  1971 at $5.88 million each.  A  1970 observation is  created as  two 
727-200 TWA  aircraft purchased at $5.44 million each. After 1966, it was 
necessary to create interpolated observations only for gaps of  a single year. 
But  in  the  early  1960s there  was  a  substantial period  between  the  initial 
purchases by  trunk carriers of  first-generation jet aircraft in 1958-61  and a 
second wave of  purchases of  the same models in  1966-68.  In this period, 
interpolated observations are created to fill a six-year gap for the American 
Airlines  707-100B between  1959 and  1966, and  a four-year gap  for  the 
United Airlines DC8-50 between 1961 and  1966. 
In  table 4.2, columns 3 and 4 exhibit the number and  value of  aircraft 
included in  the interpolated SMSA index, including the value attributed to 
the interpolated observations, and column 5 displays the percentage of  the 
weight in each adjacent year pair attributed to interpolated observations. In 
some years, no interpolation is necessary, while in other years, particularly 
1949-50,  1962-65,  and  1975-76,  a heavy weight is given to interpolated 
observations. The effects on sample size of interpolation and of the distinction 
between the SM and the SMSA criteria can be summarized by  expressing the 
average ratio of  the values displayed in column  1 for the SM index and in 
column 4 for the interpolated SMSA index to the equivalent value for the 
SMSA index without interpolation, shown in table 4.3. 
With the exception of  the post-1977 period, when the effects on sample 
size of  both  interpolation and the SM-SMSA distinction are minimal, the 
effect  of  interpolation is  to  increase  sample size by  between  20  and  45 
percent,  and  the  effect  of  using  the  SM  instead  of  the  SMSA  criterion 
(without interpolation) is to increase the sample size by  between 28 and 40 
percent. 
The two final columns of  table 4.2 display the weighted percentage price 
change for each adjacent year pair for  both  the  SM  and  the  interpolated 
SMSA  index.  Several  periods  (1959-60,  1962-63,  1976-77)  display 
zigzag movements for price change in the SM index that are not present in 
the interpolated SMSA index and are analogous to the zigzag movements in 
the  SM index calculated for the above example.  The two  series for price 
change are converted into index numbers (1972 = 100) and compared with 123  Commercial Aircraft 
’IBble 4.4  Price Indexes for Identical Aircraft (1972 = 100) 
SM  SMSA  BEA 





















































































































































Sources by  column:  (1-2)  Table 4.2, cols. 6 and 7. (3) NIPA, table 7.20, row 21 
the BEA aircraft deflator in table 4.4. The latter consists of  the CAB index 
for the period after 1957 spliced for 1947-57 to a proxy index developed by 
the  BEA  that  includes various  PPI  series unrelated  to  aircraft, including 
‘‘fabricated metal products” and ‘‘diesel engines.” 
The  implications  of  the  three  indexes  displayed in  table  4.4  for  the 
long-run rate of price change in the aircraft manufacturing industry can be 
summarized by  calculating average annual rates of  price change for each 
decade through 1977, and for the period since 197.7, seen in table 4.5. As 
shown in the bottom row, the average rate of price change of the SM and the 
interpolated SMSA indexes is virtually identical and is roughly 1 percentage 124  Chapter Four 
Table 4.5  Average Annual Rates of  Price Changes for Identical Aircraft 
SM  Interpolated SMSA  BEA 
1947-57  5.19  3.79  5.04 
1957-67  0.75  1.07  1.94 
1967-77  3.86  4.82  6.25 
1977-83  8.74  8.19  8.86 
1947-83  4.14  4.03  5.13 
Source:  Calculated from table 4.3 
point  less  per  annum  than  that  of  the  BEA  index.  In  each  of  the  four 
subperiods, the interpolated SMSA index increases less rapidly than the BEA 
index  by  a  roughly  uniform  amount,  between  0.67 and  1.43 percentage 
points per annum. The differential between the SM and the BEA indexes is 
more erratic,  and the SM index actually  grew more rapidly  than the BEA 
index in the first subinterval, 1947-57. 
4.4  Price Changes and Quality Improvements for Particular Models 
To  assess the slower rate of price increase registered by both the SM and 
the interpolated SMSA indexes as compared to the BEA index within the last 
decade, we can examine price changes on aircraft that were purchased by  a 
single airline year after year. In the last half of the 1970s, Delta was the only 
major airline that purchased the same aircraft in numerous successive years. 
The following  is  a  comparison  of  1974 and  1982, chosen  because  Delta 
purchased the L- 101  1 and 727-200 aircraft in both years: 
($ million)  ($ million) 
-1974  1982  19821  1974 
Delta L-I011  15.9  31.3  1.969 
Delta 727-200  6.7  13.0  1.940 
Interpolated SMSA index  108.9  217.3  1.995 
CAB index  115.2  247.8  2.151 
My  interpolated  SMSA  index  is  substantially  closer to  an  average of  the 
price increases registered by the two Delta aircraft than the CAB index. 
The  price  increase  registered  on  the  Delta  727-200  is  a  particularly 
important cross-check  of  the two indexes,  since that aircraft  model repre- 
sented the great  bulk  of  the airline purchases  by  major  airlines during  the 
1973-80  period, when the two indexes diverge. Another check is to take the 
average  price  paid  by  all  airlines  for  the  727-200  in  the  first  round  of 
purchases  (1969) and  the  last  year  in  which  several  of  the  large  airlines 
purchased  the  same model  (prices are listed,  with  numbers purchased  in 125  Commercial Aircraft 
Table 4.6  Average Price Wid by All Airlines for the 727-200 
1980  198011969  1969 
~~ 
American  5.4 (10)  8.9 (4) 
Delta  ...  11.6 (9) 
TWA  5.0 (2)  ... 
United  5.2 (6)  10.6 (4) 
Weighted average for 727-200  5.3  10.7  2.019 
Interpolated SMSA  91.9  177.8  1.935 
CAB index  88.7  204.3  2.303 
parentheses), listed in table 4.6.  Here, too,  the new  index is closer to the 
increases in prices paid for the 727-200. 
There is an indirect piece of  evidence that the interpolated SMSA index 
may  overstate price increases rather than understate them. The ratio of  this 
index for 1978 to its value in 1967 is 1.75. This ratio, when multiplied by 
the $3.1 million price paid for a DC9-30 model in  1967, implies that the 
same model would have sold for $5.4 million in 1978. However, in that year, 
a stretched version of  the same aircraft, having 27 percent more seats, the 
DC9-50, was  sold for only $5.6 million. I conclude that the CAB index is 
biased upward in the late 1970s, even by its own criterion of measuring price 
changes of  identical aircraft.6 
A common weakness of all the price indexes discussed thus far, including 
the interpolated SMSA index as well as the CAB index, is the assumption 
that  a  given  model  designation,  for  example,  Boeing  727-200,  indicates 
homogeneous  quality.  However,  this  does  not  prove  to  be  a  warranted 
assumption. The Boeing 727-200 was produced for seventeen years prior to 
termination of  production in  1983, the  Boeing  737-200 was  produced  for 
seventeen years, and the Boeing 747-200 was still being produced in  1988 
after sixteen years. During these long production runs, substantial changes 
were made to these aircraft. In fact, in the used  aircraft market, B727-200 
aircraft  produced  after  1974-75  are  classified  separately  as  “B727-200 
ADV,”  standing for advanced. For each aircraft model shown in table 4.7, 
standard  specifications are  listed  for both  1983 and  the  first  year  of  the 
production run. In all cases, the 1983 version of the same model designation 
incorporates substantial improvements. Chief among these are improvements 
in engine thrust and fuel economy that allow the addition of  more fuel and 
more seats to increase range, payload, and airline profitability. For instance, 
the stretched 727 models purchased by United in the late 1960s could not fly 
nonstop from Chicago to San Francisc0,whereas the models delivered in the 
6. A  qualification  to  the  comparisons  in  the  text  is  that  they  do not  include  all  aircraft 
manufactured during this period. The B-727, L-1011,  and DC-9 accounted for 53 percent of the 
number of  commercial aircraft sold in  1976-80  (Aerospace Facts and  Figures,  1981-82  ed., 
37). Table 4.7  Quality Changes on Boeing Aircraft Carrying Identical Model Numbers (prices include engines) 
737-200  727-200  747-200 
1968  1983  1967  1983  1971  1983 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
I. Engine thrust (pounds)  14,000  15,500  14,000  16,000  48,570  54,750 
2.  Gross weight  95,000  115,500  170,000  197,000  775,000  833,000 
3. Range (nautical miles)  1,300  1,850  1,700  2,250  5,160  6,130 
4. Standard seats"  101  110  I39  IS6  395  452 
5. Fuel bum (poundsimile)  15.6  15.4  21.6  25.0  51.6  46.1 
7.  Theoretical 1983 price of  configuration ($ million)  14.0  15.9  19.5  21.8  71.6  85.0 
6.  Fuel bum (poundsiseatlmile)  .I54  ,140  ,199  .I60  ,131  ,102 
Source:  Boeing Commercial Airplane Co., internal records, 1984. 
"Seating configuration adjusted from Boeing data to hold constant the number of  rows devoted to the first-class cabin 127  Commercial Aircraft 
late  1970s could do so. Full-sized 747-200 aircraft produced in the  1970s 
could not fly  nonstop from New  York  to Tokyo, but those produced in the 
1980s  could  do  so  (prematurely  making  obsolete  the  shortened  747-SP 
designed  explicitly  for  those  long  routes).  Also  included  on  the  newer 
versions (and not  shown in  table 4.7) are improved  avionics that  provide 
better navigation and flight management systems to achieve a flight path that 
is closer to optimal.’  Aircraft models developed in the 1980s, especially the 
Boeing 767 and 747-400 (as well as the Airbus,which is foreign made and 
thus not relevant for the U.S. GNP deflator), have completely computerized 
cockpits with  sophisticated self-diagnostic capabilities. For instance, a me- 
chanic can now plug a computer terminal into an engine on a 767 and watch 
the engine diagnose its own problems. 
Two  figures are  shown  on  rows  5  and  6  for  the  improvement  in  fuel 
efficiency. Row 5,  showing fuel burned in pounds per mile, understates the 
improvement in  efficiency, because the newer  aircraft are able to  carry  a 
higher payload for a given amount of fuel. The second figure in row 6 shows 
fuel burned in pounds per seat mile and obviously improves more over the 
years, by  9.5 percent for the 737-200,  21.8 percent for the 828-200, and 
25.0 percent for the 747-200. The increase in number of  seats per aircraft 
shown in row 4 holds constant the  1983 mix between first-class and coach 
seating and calculates a hypothetical number of  seats for the earlier year (by 
taking the actual earlier seating configuration, which in each case included a 
larger share of first-class seating, and converting sufficient rows of first-class 
seats to coach to achieve the same number of  first class seats as in  1983). 
The total number of  coach seats in  1983 is greater than in the earlier years 
for each aircraft, reflecting a combination of  thinner seats (allowing more 
seats to be added without sacrificing leg room), less leg room, and higher 
aircraft payload capacity. The earlier version of  the aircraft may have  been 
physically capable of  holding more seats than were actually used, but only 
by  sacrificing range (increasing the number of  passengers always results in 
decreased range for a given plane with given engines operating at a given 
gross weight,  since more weight devoted to passengers means less weight 
can  be  devoted to  carrying fuel).  So, leaving  aside  a  minor  decrease  in 
passenger comfort, the evidence of improved fuel economy in row 6 of table 
4.7 is more relevant than in row 5. 
The final row of table 4.7 shows a calculation by  Boeing of  the marginal 
cost  of  production  of  the  1983 configuration as  compared  to  the  earlier 
configuration.  The  figure  shown  for  the  earlier  year  is  the  1983 price 
adjusted for the cost of the increase in the capability of the airplanes through 
changes in gross weight, range,  engines,  fuel consumption, and  avionics. 
7. All data in table 4.7 and in this section of the text were provided by W. G. Loeken of the 
Boeing Commercial Airplane Co. in several letters sent to me in  1984. 128  Chapter Four 
The improvements on the 737-200 are estimated to have added 13.5 percent 
to its price, as compared with  11.8 percent for the 727-200 and 18.7 percent 
for the 747-200. If  we  take an unweighted average of  these three figures, 
14.7  percent,  we  can  calculate  the  implications  for  the  price  index  of 
identical models. Assume that similar improvements were made to aircraft 
produced  by  other  manufacturers,  for  example,  the  Douglas  DC-9  and 
DC-10  and  the  Lockheed  L-1011.8  The  period  1972-82  is  chosen  for 
comparison, since aircraft sales in this decade were dominated by  the three 
Boeing  models  and  the  three  other  models  produced  by  Douglas  and 
Lockheed: 
198211972 
CAB  index  2.478 
Interpolated SMSA index  2.173 
SMSA index adjusted for  14.6 percent quality change  1.896 
Thus, the CAB index exaggerates the 1972-82  price increase of commercial 
aircraft by  roughly  30  percent.  No  information is  available  to  assess the 
importance  of  this  problem  in  earlier  decades,  but  similar  quality 
improvements may  have  been  introduced over the  lifespan  of  planes that 
remained  in  production  for  a  decade,  for  example,  the  DC-6B  and  the 
Boeing  707-100B  and  707-300B.  The  substantial number of  aircraft that 
remained  in  production only  for  a  short  interval of  three  to  five  years, 
however,  including the DC-7,  the Convair 880,  the  Boeing  720,  and the 
8. The three Boeing aircraft dominated deliveries by  the U.S. commercial aircraft industry 
during  the  1972-80  period.  The following  figures are from  Aerospace  Facts  and Figures, 
various issues,  and are not available to me from the same source for years since 1980. These 
figures  cover  all  aircraft  manufactured  in  the  United  States,  including  exports  and  leased 
aircraft, and thus cover a larger universe than the SMSA or the CAB indexes in tables 4.2 and 
4.4: 
Share of Deliveries, 1972-80,  Total U.S. Industry 
(percentage of aircraft produced by number, not  value) 
1. Boeing 737 
2. Boeing 727 
3. Boeing 147 
Total, rows  1-3 
4.  Lockheed L-1011 
5.  Douglas DC-10 
6. Douglas DC-9 
7. Other 
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Boeing 727- 100, suggest that  the  “hidden  quality improvement phenome- 
non”  was  probably  less  important  in  the  1950s  and  1960s  than  in  the 
1970s. 
4.5  Quality Adjustments Based on Net Revenue Data 
The technique of  price measurement proposed in chapter 2 adjusts price 
differences between models of  a given product for changes in net  revenue 
yielded by new models, because firms purchase capital goods for their ability 
to produce “net revenue”  (defined as gross revenue minus operating costs- 
thus,  net revenue is the amount available to pay  depreciation and  interest 
charges). Holding constant the prices of  unchanged models, if  a 10 percent 
increase  in  the  price  of  new  model  B  compared  to  old  model  A  is 
accompanied by  a 10 percent increase in net revenue, no quality adjustment 
is required to an index of the prices of identical models, like those developed 
in table 4.4. However, an increase in the net revenue provided by  model B 
relative to model A that is greater than the excess of the price of  model B 
over model  A  would  call  for a  quality  adjustment to  the table  4.4 price 
index. To  repeat equation (2.35) from chapter 2, the change in the real input 




Here, v designates the purchase price of  models  1 and 0, and n designates 
their respective net revenue. 
If  (Y  = 1, then  the  second  term  in  brackets  becomes  unity,  and  the 
remaining expression states that the “real”  price change will be zero if both 
purchase price and net revenue change in proportion in the shift to the new 
model, (v,/v,)  = (nl/no).  If  the cost schedule that allows a manufacturer to 
produce a higher-cost model exhibits diminishing returns in  the  extra net 
revenue produced, then (Y  > 1, and the second term in brackets becomes a 
fraction less than unity. Why is the second term in brackets, the “curvature 
adjustment,” required? In the presence of  diminishing returns, a movement 
along a fixed cost function should yield a less-than-proportionate increase in 
n for a given increase in v, and the first bracketed term would erroneously 
register  a  price  increase when  in  fact  the  cost  function had  not  shifted. 
Imagine a downward shift in the cost function sufficient in the presence of 
diminishing returns  to  yield  an  increase  in  n  proportionate  to  that  in  v. 
Again, the first bracketed term would erroneously register no change in price 
when in fact the cost function has shifted downward. Thus,  the curvature 
adjustment corrects for the fact that, in the presence of diminishing returns in 130  Chapter Four 
the  production  of  n  in  response  to increased  v,  the  first  term  in  brackets 
always overstates the real price increase. 
The nominal  input  price  index  Api/pi is  then  obtained  by  adding  the 
increase in the real input price from (4.5) to the change in the price index for 
identical models (AC/C). Copying (2.36) for convenience, we have: 
(4.6) 
Thus,  the  purpose  of  this  section  is  to develop measures  of  net  revenue 
suitable  for creating  the year-to-year  changes in the real  input price  index 
from  equation  (4.5). Subsequently,  these  changes  will  be  added  to  the 
changes in the interpolated  SMSA price  index  for identical models shown 
above in column 2 of  table 4.4. 
Any attempt to calculate changes in real input price using (4.5) will yield 
results  that  are  sensitive  to the  assumptions made about  expectations. In 
comparing  a  new  and  an  old  model  at  a  particular  time,  the  ratio  of 
current-period  prices  (v,/v,)  can be  observed in  a  straightforward  manner, 
but  the  ratio  of  net  revenue  (n,/n,) depends  on  expected  output  prices, 
expected  output  productivity,  expected  input  prices,  and  expected  input 
requirements,  not  to mention  the  expected  lifetimes  of  the  new  and  old 
models  (the  lifetime  itself  is  an economic  decision  that  depends  on the 
unpredictable  evolution  of  aircraft  revenues  and  costs).  A  number  of 
assumptions could be made about the revenue and cost calculations of users 
making  aircraft  purchasing  decisions  over  the  years,  including  static 
expectations,  extrapolation of  past trends, and expectations that are accurate 
ex post. 
It would make no sense to proxy expectations as an extrapolation of  past 
trends in the airline industry, since the introduction of  the jet plane created a 
clean break with past operating conditions. Static expectations would also be 
a weak assumption, since labor expenses are a major component of  airline 
operating costs, and wage rates have risen regularly every year (recall table 
4.1 above). 
The assumption  that  seems easiest  to justify is accurate expectations  ex 
post. In the analysis that follows, the sales price of a new model is compared 
with  that  of  an  old model  (vl/vo)  in  the  year of  introduction  of  the new 
model. However, when possible, the ratio of  net revenue for the two models 
(n,ln,)  is calculated  not only for that year, but also for several years in the 
future. The exact procedure  is to calculate  net  revenue ratios  for several 
years, starting with the year of introduction of the new model and continuing 
with years spaced five years apart (1967, 1972, 1977, etc.) until the date of 
retirement of the old model. Two factors prevent this procedure from being 
carried out for every model pair.  First, the CAB operating cost data are not 
available in their present form before  1965, and, for comparisons involving 131  Commercial Aircraft 
the transition from late-model piston aircraft to early-model jet aircraft, only 
a single observation (in some cases taken from previous research monographs 
on the industry) is available. The second limitation occurs when only a short 
time interval is available between the introduction of  a new model and the 
retirement  of  the  corresponding old  model.  Since  the  Lockheed  Electra 
(L188) was  retired  shortly  after  1965,  only  one  comparison is  available 
between  that  aircraft and  the  Boeing  727-100 (the successor aircraft that 
typically replaced the Electra on medium-length routes). However, since the 
727-100 has remained in service to this date, four comparisons of operating 
cost are available between the Boeing 727-100 and the “stretched”  727-200, 
in 1968, 1972, 1977, and 1982.9  Whatever the limitations of this procedure, 
it seems to be the best available alternative and has the advantage that each 
pairwise comparison applies to a single year, thus holding constant output 
prices and the prices of operating inputs, particularly fuel and the wages of 
flight crews and maintenance labor. 
The most important determinant of aircraft operating costs per seat mile at 
a given level of  technology is “stage  length”  or “length  of  hop.”  A very 
short flight mainly consists of expensive takeoff and landing operations, with 
a  slow  average  speed,  whereas  a  long  flight  amortizes  the  takeoff  and 
landing over a multihour flight segment at cruising speed. This fact dictates 
that the pairs of new and old models in the net revenue comparisons must be 
chosen  to  have  roughly  similar  stage  lengths  in  actual  operation.  Basic 
operating characteristics and cost data for successive generations of  aircraft 
are presented in the three parts of  table 4.8, that is, part A for long-range 
aircraft,  part  B  for  medium  range,  and  part  C  for  short  range.  Fifteen 
comparisons appear in  the three  sections of  the table,  involving  eighteen 
different aircraft models. In size, the aircraft range from the small, two-engine 
piston  short-range  Convair  340/440,  with  forty-four  seats,  to  the  large 
wide-bodied long-range turbofan Boeing 747-100, with over 400 seats and 
capable  of  providing  roughly  twenty-five  times  the  annual  capacity.  In 
chronological time,  the  aircraft  models  span  the  entire  postwar  period, 
beginning with the staple of  early postwar air travel, the Douglas DCdB, 
and  continuing through  the  newest  generation of  jet  aircraft,  the  Boeing 
767-200 and the McDonnell-Douglas DC9-80 (now called the MD-80). The 
major types of  aircraft that are excluded (to limit the time devoted to the 
analysis) are planes that are virtual duplicates of  those analyzed here (e.g., 
the Boeing 707-100B, which is similar to the Douglas DC8-50), and a few 
planes that had short production runs (e.g., the Convair 880/990). There is 
also no coverage of  aircraft used by  commuter airlines. 
The three sections of  table 4.8 are arranged to present for each pair of 
models  all the data used  to calculate net  revenue.  Annual  net  revenue in 
9. The  limitation to  comparisons at  five-year intervals,  rather than  shorter intervals,  was 
chosen to control the time devoted to this phase of the research. Table 4.8  Revenue and Operating Cost Data: Long, Medium, and Short Range 
Plane 
Types 
Revenue  Gross  Net  Operating  Annual 
Hours  Air  Annual  Revenue  Revenue  cost  Net 
per  Speed  asm  Stage  Load  per  per  per  Revenue 
Year  (mph)  Seats  (millions)  Length  Factor  'pm  asm  asm  (7)-(8)  ($million) 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
A. Long range: 
I. B767-200 
LlOlI-100 
2.  A300-B2 
LlOlI-100 





















































































































































.1254  ,0435 
,1254  ,0435 
.I274  ,0400 
.I274  ,0400 
,1279  ,0403 
,1279  ,0403 
,0896  ,0274 
,0896  ,0274 
.0648  ,0179 
.0648  ,0179 
,1231  ,0416 
,1231  ,0416 
,0861  ,0294 
,0861  ,0294 
,0658  ,0176 
.0658  .0176 
,1157  3423 
,1157  .0423 
.0808  .0283 
.a808  ,0283 
.0576  .0162 
,0576  .0162 
,0310 
,0325 










































































10.  8727-100 
L-188 
11.  B-720B 
L-188 






















































































250.4  858 
173.2  946 
256.4  867 
188.8  847 
342.1  1,094 
233.4  910 
222.4'  84 I 
81 .5c  750d 
191.7  701 
187.4  639 
157.8  639 
119.7  666 
155.6  506 
117.2  571 
136.0  550 
106.1  542 
159.0  545 
118.3  492 
92.8'  510 
59.Y  500d 
152.6'  698 
68.2'  500d 
60.3c  500d 
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,0094  2.063 
,0019  0.288 
,0098  2.513 
.0072  1.359 
.0092  3.147 
,0064  1.494 
,0098  2.180 
,0013  0.106 
,0174  3.336 
,0058  1.087 
,0084  1.326 
- ,0018  -0.215 
,0132  2.054 
.m57  0.068 
,0121  1.641 
,0088  0.934 
.0136  2.162 
.0083  0.982 
.0143  1.327 
,0123  0.737 
.0110  0.750 
,0110  0.663 
.0050  0. I97 
,0123  1.846 Table 4.8 (continued) 
Plane 
Types 
Revenue  Gross  Net  Operating  Annual 
Hours  Air  Annual  Revenue  Revenue  Cost  Net 
per  Speed  asm  Stage  Load  Per  per  Per  Revenue 
Year  (mph)  Seats  (millions)  Length  Factor  rpm  asm  asm  (7j-(8)  ($million) 
Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (81  (9)  (10)  (11) 
C. Short range: 
13.  DC9-50  1982  2,655 
DC9-30  2,516 
1977  2,694 
2,763 
14  DC9-30  I982  2,516 
DC9- 10  2,375 
I977  2,763 
2,362 
1972  2,927 
2,449 
I968  2,373 
2,533 
15.  DC9-10  1965  2,789 















124.5  124.9 
100.5  100.8 
114.9  118.5 
91.4  94.3 
100.5  94.1 
83.5  78.2 
91.4  88.5 
70.3  68.1 
89.4  92.0 
66.7  68.7 
90. I  81.8 
69.9  63.4 
66.6  77.3' 



































































































Sources by  column.  (In the following notes,AOCPR  refers to U.S. CAB, Aircruff Operating Cost and Performance  Reporf,  issued annually,  1965-84.)  (1) Revenue  hours per year, from 
AOCPR for the year in question. Blanks indicate that no figures are shown for piston planes, which are allocated the same yearly utilization as the first plane listed in each comparison. Also, 
the extremely  low utilization of  the R707-3008 in  1982 and DC8-50 in  1977 is ignored, and the utilization  of  the comparison aircraft is used instead in those years. (2) Air speed is from 
AOCPR, except for comparisons noted by ", which are from Douglas and Miller (1974), where block speeds shown are converted to air speed using the air/block ratio for the first plane listed 
in each comparison. (3) Average available seats per aircraft mile from AOCPR. (4) Annual available seat miles equals col. 3 times the average for each pair of models of revenue hours from 
col.  1 times the average for the two models in  each comparison of air speed from col. 2.  For comparison marked with ',  involving Comparisons of jets with turboprops or piston planes, the 
calculation of annual available seat miles uses air speeds in col. 2 for each separate aircraft, rather than the average of the two. (5)  Stage length is taken from AOCPR, except for comparisons 
marked with ",where operating cost comparisons for both planes in the pair are taken from Strazheim (1969. 74) for the stage length indicated. (6)  Load factors are from AOCPR for the year 
shown. (7)  Gross revenue per revenue passenger miles is taken from a yield curve for  1971 adjusted for discounts, as displayed in Douglas and Miller (1974, 90). Points on the curve not 
shown in the Douglas-Miller table are interpolated linearly. The resulting yield is converted from a 1971 basis to the yield for each comparison year by using a conversion factor equal to the 
ratio of average passenger yield in that year to average passenger yield for 1971, from Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan (1985, app. A). (8) Net revenue per available seat mile is obtained by 
multiplying gross revenue per revenue passenger mile in col. 7 by two ratios. The first is the average load factor for the two planes in each comparison, from col. 6. The second is the ratio 
of  aircraft operating costs plus flight equipment maintenance plus depreciation plus interest to total gross revenue  minus imputed profit, 57.2 percent  for the twelve months ending 30 June 
1981, from Bailey, Graham, and Kaplan (1985, table 3.3, p. 136). (9) Flying operations costs plus flight equipment maintenance  per available seat mile are from AOCPR, and are calculated 
by dividing average cost per block hour by seating capacity times block speed. The average speed for the two aircraft in a pair is used to adjust for the tilt of  the cost curve. Average cost 
figures denoted by  are taken from Straszheim (1969, 74, 86). which referr  to 1965. Straszheini's average cost figures refer to the stage length denoted by " in col. 5 and are adjusted to 
deduct depreciation in order to make them comparable to the other entries in this column. (10) Equals col. 7 minus col. 8. (11) Equals col.  10  times col. 4. 135  Commercial Aircraft 
millions of dollars is shown in the right-hand column 11, and the ingredients 
in arriving at that figure are shown in the other columns. The stages in the 
calculation are as follows. 
1. Annual available seat miles, that is, total output per year, is calculated 
as the product of hours per year, times air speed, times the number of seats. 
For jet  aircraft,  hours  per  year  is  the  actual  time  flown,  but,  for  piston 
aircraft by the  1960s, hours per year  were  very  low-far  below  the actual 
time flown  in the  prejet  era, and  so the  annual  hours  for the  comparison 
aircraft  are  used  instead.  Since piston  aircraft,  even in  their  heyday,  had 
more frequent maintenance  downtime, this  procedure  overstates the annual 
output of piston aircraft. This error is one of several, including the decision 
to ignore the value of time savings and greater comfort, that make the final 
index  understate  the  quality  improvement  involved  in  the  transition  from 
piston to jet aircraft.  Since jet aircraft generally fly at the same speed on a 
given  route,  annual  capacity  (col.  4)  is  calculated  by  taking  the  average 
speed  of  the  two  jet  aircraft  shown.  For  comparisons  involving  piston 
aircraft,  speeds are taken  from a  source that  displays  speeds  for different 
aircraft types at given stage lengths. As for seating capacity, this is taken as 
the  actual  figure  in different  years.  Note  that  the  seating  capacity  of  jet 
aircraft has generally increased since the early  1970s, reflecting a marketing 
decision to reduce the space devoted to the first-class cabin, the development 
of  thinner  seats,  the  development  of  overnead  baggage  racks  that  allow 
passengers to occupy less space without a proportional loss of comfort, and 
new engines that have increased the range and passenger-carrying capacity of 
aircraft carrying  an unchanged  model  number.  Effects  of  changing  seating 
configurations are examined in table 4.1 1 below. 
2. Gross revenue per revenue passenger mile, or passenger “yield,”  is not 
based on published fares, which overstate the increase in fares over the years 
by  neglecting  discounts.  Instead,  the  yield  calculation  begins  with  a yield 
curve adjusted for discounts from Douglas and Miller (1974). Then the yield 
for a particular  stage length for years before and after  1971 is calculated by 
taking the point on that curve and multiplying  it by  the change in  average 
passenger yield (this takes account both of discounts and of the changing mix 
between  first  class  and  coach)  between  1971  and  the  year  of  the  model 
comparison. 
3.  The definition  of  load  factor  (If)  is revenue  passenger  miles  (rpm) 
divided by available seat miles (asm) (If  = rpdasm). Since operating costs 
are collected on an asm basis,  it is necessary  to convert yield per rpm (col. 
7) to yield per  asm. Another  adjustment is to subtract from gross revenue 
that fraction that must be set aside to cover airline operating costs other than 
direct costs of flying operations. Gross revenue is converted to a net basis by 
a multiplicative factor equal to the ratio of  aircraft operating costs, including 
flight equipment  maintenance  plus  depreciation  and  interest,  to total  gross 
revenue minus imputed profit, from the recent study by Bailey, Graham, and 136  Chapter Four 
Kaplan (1985). The resulting figure, expressed in column 8 on a basis per 
asm,  is  the  amount  available  to  cover  costs  of  flying  operations  and 
maintenance shown in column 9. The difference, shown on an asm basis in 
column 10 and on a per-annum basis in column 11, is then available to cover 
depreciation and interest, with any residual contributing to operating profit. 
The resulting estimates of  net revenue display a fairly consistent pattern. 
In  those  comparisons,  in  which  net  revenue  estimates  are  available  for 
several successive five-year intervals, note that the relative advantage of the 
newer model in generating net revenue seems to increase as time goes on. 
For instance, the net revenue per asm of the 747-100 is only slightly above 
that of  the  707-300 in  1972, but by  1982 the figure for the 747-100 has 
increased while  that  for the  707-300 has  become  negative.  Similarly, the 
1982 estimate for the 727-100 is negative. Thus, it is not surprising that by 
1982 most  U.S. airlines had  grounded  and/or retired  their  fleets  of  707 
aircraft  and  were  operating  727- 100 aircraft  at  relatively  low  utilization 
rates. Overall, it appears that the DC-9 series of short-haul aircraft produces 
the highest net revenue per asm, but total annual net  revenue is highest for 
the Boeing 747-100, owing to its large annual capacity of  asms. 
Table 4.9 combines these net  revenue estimates with  data  on  the sales 
prices of  various plane types. The prices are the same as those used in table 
4.2 to compute the price indexes for identical models. In  most cases,  the 
“old”  and  “new”  models  being  compared were  not  actually constructed 
simultaneously, requiring the adjustment of  the price of the old model for 
changes in the price of identical models (using the interpolated SMSA index) 
between  the  year of  its disappearance and the  first  sales year of  the new 
model. In this way, the sales prices of the two planes in each comparison are 
computed  for  the  same year,  allowing the  price  of  output  and  operating 
inputs to be held constant. For instance, in part A of table 4.9, there was no 
overlap in the construction dates of the L-1011 and DC8-61. The comparison 
for 1972 uses the average sales price for that year for the airlines purchasing 
the L-1011, from the data base used in developing tables 4.2 and 4.4 above. 
The price for the DC8-61 is the average 1968 price from the same data base, 
times the 1972/1968 ratio of the interpolated SMSA index in table 4.3. The 
1977 and  1982 comparisons exhibit the implied prices when the 1972 price 
comparison is adjusted for the change in the interpolated SMSA index after 
1972. 
Each table is arranged with the comparisons of  the most recent models at 
the top of  each of  the three sections (for long range,  medium range,  and 
short  range),  while at  the  bottom  are  displayed the  comparisons for the 
transition between piston and jet aircraft. Column 4 shows the ratio of annual 
net  revenue to  the  implied  replacement price  and  indicates the  enormous 
profitability  of  jet  planes,  compared  to  the  piston  planes  they  replaced. 
Because most airlines depreciated their piston planes over seven- or eight-year 
intervals, it is apparent that the DC-7 in part A of  table 4.9 must have have Table 4.9  Calculation of Rice Change: Long,  Medium, and Short Range 
Price  Net Revenue  (7) With 
Original  in Comparison  in Comparison  (5)1(6)  Curvature 
Adjustment  Plane  Price (Year)  Year  Year  nJv,  V L t /YO,  ndno,  -I 
Types  Year  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
A. Long  range: 
I. B767-200 
LIOII-100 































































































































0.288  0.354 
-0.516  -0.560 
-0.573  -0.681 
0.276  0.185 
0.933  1.026 
-0.452  -0.569 
0.225  0.131 
0.251  0.160 
...  ... 
-0.399  -0.564 
0.032  -0.166 
(continued) Table 4.9 (continued) 
Plane 
Types 
Price  Net Revenue  (7) With 
Original  in Comparison  in Comparison  (346)  Curvature 
Price (Year)  Year  Ycar  n,/v,  vlrhlr  "Itl"0,  -I  Adjustment 



































































































































































-  0.145 












-0.599 C. Short range: 
13.  DC9-50  1982  5.6  (1978)  8.0 
DC9-30  3.1  ( 1967)  7.7 
1977  5. I 
5.0 
14.  DC9-30  1982  3.1  ( 1967)  7.7 
DC9-I0  2.8  (1966)  7.0 
1977  4.9 
4.5 
1972  3.5 
3.2 
1967  3.1 
2.8 
15.  DC9-10  1965  2.8  (1966)  2.8 
CV340/440  0.6  (1957)  0.7 
2.948  0.369 
1.552  0.202 
3.069  0.602 
1.688  0.338 
1.684  0.259 




,900  -0.453  -0.519 
,818  -0.429  -0.493 













0.403  4.m  10.349  -0.613  -  0.758 
0.156 
0.521  1.100  1.668  -0.340  -0.405 
0.483  1.100  1.449  -0.241  -0.291 
Sources by column:  (1) All price data are for airframes, excluding engines, from CAB Form 41, Schedule 8-43, Table 4.7 shows the average price paid by the following airlines, with the year 
of the schedule 8-43 shown in parentheses for all comparisons but the first. Long range: (1) Schedule B-7, price paid by Delta for both the 767 and the L-1011  in the quarter ending 6-30-83; 
(2) A-300, Eastern, price paid in 1981 (12-31-82); L-1011,  Delta, price paid in  1981 (12-31-82); (3) L-loll.  average price paid by Eastern and TWA in  1972 (12-31-73); DC8-61, average 
price paid by Delta and United in 1968 (12-31-73); (4) DCIO-10, average price paid by American and United in  1972 (12-31-73): DC8-61, same as comparison 3; (5) 8747-100, average price 
paid by United in 1972 (12-31-73); 8707-3008, average price paid by TWA in 1966 (12-31-67); (6) DC8-61, same as comparison 3; DC8-50, average price paid by Delta and United in  1966 
(12-31-67); (7) DC8-50, same as comparison 6; Dc-7, average price paid by  United  in  I958  (12-31-61). Medium  range: (I) DC9-80,  average price paid  by PSA in  the quarter ending 
6-30-83, from schedule 8-7; B727-200, average price paid by  American,  TWA, and United  in  1969 (12-31-73); (2) 8727.200,  average price paid by  American,  TWA, and United in  1969 
(12-31-73); B727-100, average price paid by TWA  in  1%9  (12-31-73); (3) B727-100, average price paid by  United  in  1963 (12-31-67); L-188,  average price paid by  American  in  1959 
(12-31-67); (4) B-720B, average price paid by American, Braniff, and United in  1961 (12-31-61); DC-6B, average price paid by United in  1958 (12-31-61); (5)  L-188, same as comparison 
3; DC-6B. same as comparison 4. Short range: (I) DC9-50, average price paid by  Eastern  in  1978 (12-31-78); DC9-30, average price paid by  Delta and Eastern  in  1967 (12-31-67); (2) 
DC9-30, same as comparison  1; DC9-10, average price paid by TWA in  1966 (12-31-67); (3) DC9-10,  same as comparison 2; CV-440, average price paid by  Delta and Eastern  in  1957 
(12-31-61). (2) Price in comparison year is the price shown in col.  1, multiplied by the ratio of the interpolated SMSA price index for identical models in the comparison year relative to the 
year shown in  col.  1, from table 4.4, col. 2. (3) Table 4.4, col. 11. (4) Ratio of  col. 3 to  col. 2. (5)  Ratio of col. 2 for first-listed model to second-listed  model.  (6) Ratio of col. 3 for 
first-listed model to  second-listed model. (7) Ratio of col. 5 to col. 6, minus  1.0. (8) Ratio of col. 5 to col. 6, times col. 6 raised to the  -0.2  power, minus  1.0. 140  Chapter Four 
been operated at a loss, with an n/v ratio of just 0.027, while the DC-6B and 
Convair  340l440 exhibit  nlv  ratios  of  0.156  each,  just  sufficient  to  pay 
depreciation without leaving anything left over for profit. The most profitable 
aircraft appear to have been the DC8-61 in  1968, the 727-200 in  1968, and 
the DC9-50 in  1977, with respective nlv ratios of 0.420, 0.416, and 0.478. 
These ratios may seem unreasonably high, and one reason for this is that the 
aircraft prices shown in table 4.9 exclude engines,  implying a total price 
about 25 percent higher than shown in column 1 and an nlv  ratio about 20 
percent lower than that  shown in column 4. As  long as there has been no 
significant drift over time in the ratio of engine prices to airframe prices, the 
omission  of  engine  prices  should  not  influence  the  remaining  results 
discussed below. 
Seven of  the fifteen model comparisons in table 4.9 provide net revenue 
data that cover more than one year. This allows us to examine the pattern of 
change in the net revenue of new relative to old models as the new models 
“age”  following their year of  introduction. To  the extent that new models 
are larger than old models and allow a reduction in labor cost and fuel cost 
per passenger, we should expect to find that the relative profitability of  new 
models declines less rapidly than that of  old models over time as fuel and 
labor costs rise.  And  we  should expect  a  discontinuity after the  two  oil 
shocks  of  1973-74  and  1979-80,  since  these  were  events  that  caused 
quantum jumps  in  the  price  of  airline  fuel  and  should  have  resulted  in 
substantial declines in  the profitability  of  older, less  fuel-efficient models 
compared to new models. 
The seven model comparisons in table 4.9 that cover more than one year 
are based on identical ratios of  sales prices (vl/vo),  but ratios of  net revenue 
(nl/no) that reflect the differing operating conditions of each year. Since the 
relative  price changes  displayed  in  column  7  depend  only  on  these  two 
ratios, they provide a concise summary of changes in profitability over time. 
The expected decline over time in the profitability of  the old model relative 
to the new model should be reflected in relative price changes in column 7 
that  shift in a negative direction (either from positive to negative or from 
negative to more negative).This presumption of a negative shift in the price 
changes displayed in column 7 is confirmed by  each of the seven multiyear 
model  comparisons.  Consider,  for  example,  the  four  multiyear  model 
comparisons displayed for long-range aircraft in part A of table 4.9. The first 
three of these (L-1011 vs. DC8-61; DC10-10 vs. DC8-61; and B747-100 vs. 
B707-300B) indicate a relative price increase in the year of introduction, but 
by  1982 a substantial relative price decrease. In the fourth comparison, a 
price decrease of 37.5 percent in 1968 becomes a decrease of 8  1.6 percent in 
1977, as shown in column 7. 
While increasing fuel and labor costs were mainly responsible for making 
older models uneconomical in the 1972-82 period, an additional factor was a 
change in marketing philosophy. Originally, the new larger aircraft, especially 141  Commercial Aircraft 
Table 4.10  Number of Seats,  Seat Widths,  and Pitch for United Airlines, for Various 
Models of  Jet Aircraft 
Total Number of  Seats  Seat Width (inches)”  Pitch (inches)* 
Boeing 747 



























Sources:  Seating capacity and dimensions from Great Seats in the Friendly Skies, brochure, United Airlines, 
July  1983. 
”Seat widths and pitch are Just for the economy cabin, but the first-class cabin generally contains 10 percent or 
less of the total seats 
the wide-bodied 747, DC-10, and L-1011, were introduced with wider seats 
and  greater “pitch”  (i.e.,  distance between  seats) than the narrow-bodied 
models that they replaced. It is impossible to place a quantitative value on 
the benefit that  passengers received in  the early years of  the  wide-bodied 
aircraft,  since  there  was  no  fare  differential  to  test  the  passengers’ 
willingness to pay for comfort. However, as rising fuel prices created tough 
times for the airline industry, marketing executives recognized an opportunity 
to equalize the seating density of  wide-bodied and narrow-bodied aircraft. 
Thus,  note in  part A of  table 4.8 that  average seats in  the 747 increased 
between 1972 and 1982 from 317 to 406, in the DC-10 from 225 to 265, and 
in the L-1011 from 214 to 288. 
The presumption  is  that  this  shift made  the  comfort  of  a wide-bodied 
aircraft equivalent to that  of  a narrow-bodied aircraft like the DC8-61  or 
B707-300, rather than  inferior to that  of  a narrow-bodied aircraft. This is 
supported by  evidence that the seating configurations that have been typical 
in  recent  years  provide  comparable seating width  and  pitch  in  older and 
newer models of  jet aircraft. Corroborative figures are available for United 
Airlines,  given  in  table  4.10.  Since  seat  width  is  virtually  the  same, 
differences in passenger comfort could be attributed only to pitch. However, 
these figures for seat pitch do not suggest any substantial revision in the net 
revenue calculations in  table 4.8  for  1982, and  they  do suggest  that  the 
net  revenue of  wide-bodied  aircraft in  their early years  (e.g.,  1972) was 
understated  due  to  the  temporary  provision  to  the  passenger  of  extra 
comfort. lo 
10.  For  instance,  that  1982 ratio  for  the  comparison of the  DC10-10  with  the  DC8-61 
indicates a seating ratio of 1.327. The ratio for the United configuration displayed in the text is 
1,330, almost the  same, and  these two aircraft as flown by  United offer passengers the  same 
seating pitch  (the  airframe  of the  DC8-71  is  identical to  that  of the  DC8-61, since the  two 
models  differ only in  the  quieter, more  fuel-efficient engines installed on  the  DC8-71). The 
tighter  pitch  of  the  727-200 than  the  727-100 in  the  United configuration might  call  for  a 142  Chapter Four 
The final column  in table 4.9 provides  an  estimate  of  the  relative price 
change  that  takes  account  of  the  curvature  of  the  function  that  links  the 
relative price of new models to their relative capacity of earning net revenue. 
There appears to be no direct way of estimating this function by examining 
the cross section of planes built at any given time, because the planes built in 
the long-range, medium-range,  and short-range categories are really separate 
products that defy comparisons.  Further,  at any given  time,  only the most 
advanced plane in each category is constructed. In lieu of any direct evidence 
on  the  curvature  of  the  function  by  which  aircraft  manufacturers  translate 
extra cost into extra ability to generate net revenue, the curvature parameter 
used in the calculations in column 8 of table 4.9  has been assigned a value of 
1.2, implying  diminishing  returns,  with  an  elasticity  of  net  revenue  to 
increases  in  manufacturing  cost of  U1.2 = 0.833. If  an  increase  in  net 
revenue can be  achieved  with constant  returns in manufacturing  cost, then 
the  relative  price  changes  exhibited  in  column  7  are  relevant,  whereas  a 
greater  degree  of  diminishing  returns  would  imply  the  need  for  a greater 
curvature adjustment than that shown in column 8. 
As noted  above, some of the relative price comparisons in table 4.9 are 
influenced  by  changes  in  seating  configurations  over  time;  wide-bodied 
aircraft introduced in the early 1970s initially offered passengers the comfort 
of wider seats than on narrow-bodied aircraft, but gradually these seats were 
replaced by the  standard seats with which other jet aircraft were equipped. 
At least part of the relatively low profitability of wide-bodied aircraft in table 
4.9 in  1972 can be explained by  low  seating capacities.  To investigate the 
importance of  this  point,  table  4.11  repeats  the  curvature-adjusted  price 
changes  from  column  8 of  table  4.9 and  compares  these  with  equivalent 
price changes  recalculated  to hold  constant  the  seating capacity of  aircraft 
(the base year is the most recent year shown in table 4.11, designated by an 
asterisk).  For  instance,  the first pair of models  shown, the L1011-100 and 
DC8-61, exhibit a relative price increase of 102.6 percent in the introductory 
year  of  1972, but  when  net  revenue  for both  aircraft  is  recalculated  with 
1982 seating capacities(which  raises annual capacity  and reduces operating 
cost per unit of capacity), the relative price increase is a much smaller 22.8 
percent.  The average relative price decline  in the comparisons  displayed in 
table 4.11 is  22.3 percent  with  actual  seating capacities  and  28.0 percent 
with standard base-year seating capacities. 
The relative price changes with standardized seating configurations exhibit 
a  consistent  pattern  in  almost  all  the  model  comparisons.  There  is  little 
“comfort adjustment.” But this would be minor: the seating capacity ratio in pt. B of table 4.8 
for 1982 is 1.319, and the United ratio for 1983 with the differing comfort is 1.361. Assuming 
that  a thirty-four-inch pitch for  the coach cabin of the United 727-200 would reduce seating 
capacity from 147 to  139, for a seating capacity ratio for the 727-200 vs. the 727-100 of 1.287. 
This would reduce the annual net revenue figure for the 727-200 given in pt. B of table 4.8 by 
only 2.4 percent, not enough to create any appreciable change in the results. 143  Commercial Aircraft 
Table 4.11  Relative Price Changes Calculated with and without Standard 1982 Seating 
Configuration (includes curvature adjustment) 
Models 
in  Pair 
Actual  Standard Base-Year 
Year  Configuration  Configuration 
(1)  (2) 
LIOIl-100  1982* 
DC8-61  1977 
1972 
DCIO-10  1982* 
DC8-61  1977 
1972 
B747-100  1982* 
B707-300B  1977 
1972 
DC8-61  1917* 
DC8-50  1972 
I968 
B727-200  1982’ 
B727-100  1977 
1972 
DC9-30  1982* 
DC9-10  1977 
1972 
1967 






































Source:  Tables 4.8 and 4.9; method explained in text. 
*Base year. 
difference in the relative price changes recorded for 1967-68  and 1972, but 
then the relative price change shifts in a negative direction between 1972 and 
1977 and again between 1977 and 1982. The pattern reflects the influence of 
the  1973-74  and  1979-80  oil  shocks,  which  had  a  greater  impact  in 
reducing the estimated net revenue of older models, and hence increasing the 
estimated relative price decline between the old and new models, due to the 
higher fuel consumption per seat mile of older models. (The two comparisons 
designated by ellipses points for 1982 are consistent with a greater advantage 
of  newer models than in  1977, i.e.,  a greater relative price decline, but in 
these  cases  the  net  revenue  of  the  older  model  has  become  negative, 
preventing the calculation of the extent of the relative price decline.) 
4.6  Used Aircraft Prices and Pairwise Model Quality Comparisons 
All the painvise model relative price changes developed in the last section 
were based on constructed estimates of  net revenue. However, the  “true” 
value  of  one  aircraft  model  compared  to  another  is  established  in  the 
marketplace for used  assets.  While  many  categories of  capital goods are 
either “bolted down”  or require high moving costs to be sold, commercial 144  Chapter Four 
aircraft are among the most mobile of capital goods, and are bought and sold 
constantly on an active market for used aircraft.  It has been estimated that 
the value of used aircraft transactions involving U.  S. airlines has cumulated 
to $4.5 billion over the  1970-83  period (Avmark 1984). Since it is possible 
to obtain price quotes or estimates from the used aircraft market for most of 
the models involved in the comparisons of tables 4.8, 4.9, and 4.11, we can 
test  the  implication  of  the  theoretical  analysis  in  chapter  2.  There  was 
derived the condition that used asset prices of different models observed at a 
given  moment  should  be  observed  to be  proportional  to  their  respective 
ability to earn net revenue.  Repeating equation (2.38), we have: 
(4.7) 
where A  is the price of  the used asset at a given time, and N  is net revenue 
for the  same model.  In  this  light, we  can view  the  investigation  of used 
aircraft prices  as a test  of  the validity  of  the estimates  of  net  revenue  (N) 
contained in the last section. An important reason why the valuation of two 
models  in  the  marketplace  may  differ  from  the  net revenue  estimates  is a 
different  depreciation  rate  on  model  1  and  model  2, in  contrast  to  the 
assumption of  identical depreciation rates in the  derivation of  (4.7)  and of 
the  net  revenue ratios  in table  4.8. For  instance,  the marketplace  knew  in 
1982  that  the  DC8-61  aircraft  would  become  obsolete  in  1985  under 
then-announced  federal  antinoise regulations,  and this model is valued less 
by  the  used  aircraft  market  than  would  be  implied  by  our  net  revenue 
estimates. '' 
Table 4.12 displays  used  price  quotations  for the  same years  that  were 
chosen above for the pairwise model net revenue comparisons (no quotations 
for  1967-68  are  available).  Every  model  that  appears  in  the  net  revenue 
comparisons  is  also  listed  here,  with  the  single  exception  of  the  recently 
introduced Boeing 767. Figures enclosed in parentheses indicate actual price 
quotations (asking prices for 1965, transaction prices for other years), while 
other  figures  are  estimates  made  by  the  Avmark  Newsletter,  a  trade 
publication that covers activity in the used aircraft market. It is evident from 
table  4.12  that  there  is  a  high  correlation  between  price  quotations  and 
estimates when both are available for the same model and the same year, and 
that discrepancies are mainly in the direction of Avmark underestimating the 
value of  newer models, for example, the advanced Boeing  727-200 and the 
DC9-50.  The  advantage  of  including  the  Avmark  estimates  is  that  they 
provide  figures  for  1977 and  1982 covering  several  planes  for  which  no 
11.  The  residual  value  of  the  DC8-61  in  1982 was  for its  conversion  potential.  It  was 
economically  feasible to  attach  new  modem  engines to  this  aircraft  model,  which  was then 
rechristened the DC8-71. Such conversions were not economical for the nonstretched 8-707 and 
nonstretched DC8-50 models, and so their prices by  1982 had fallen close to scrap value. 145  Commercial Aircraft 
Table 4.12  Prices of Used Commercial Aircraft, Various Years, by Model (in $million) 
1965  1972  1977  1982 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Long range: 
I. A300-B2 
2.  LIOII-100 
3. D10-10 
4.  B747-100 
5. DC8-61 
6.  DC8-50 
7.  B707-300B 
8. DC-7 
Medium range: 
9.  DCY-80 
10.  B727-200(ADV)” 
11.  8727-200 
12.  8727-100 
13.  8-7208 





18.  DC9-10 


















. . . (1.0) 














5.8  (5.3) 
2.0  (1.7) 
9.5 (10.7)‘ 
5.3  (5.3) 
2.5  (1.9) 
Note: All numbers in parentheses are actual price quotes, i.e., the average price paid for all aircraft of  a given 
type  sold  in  a given  year.  Sources  for price  quotes  by  year  are:  1965: Aircraft  Exchange  and Services 
Newsletter, no.  130, 8 January  1965 (prices shown are asking prices); 1972,1977, 1982: prices actually paid 
are read off charts published in  the Avmurk Newsletter,  various dates. The charts cover the period 1970-82 
and indicate for each year (1970-77)  and each quarter (1978-82) the number of  aircraft of a given type sold 
and the average price received. The charts used and dates of  publication are as follows: DC8-50, DC8-61: 
March  1982, 16; Boeing 7208, 707-120B. 707-3208:  March  1983,  16; DCY-10, DCY-30,  DC9-50, Boeing 
737-200: September 1983, 18; 8727.100,  B727-200, B727-200 (ADV): October  1983, 20; All numbers not 
in parentheses are estimates of current market value published semiannually in the Avmark Newslerter. Price 
quotes shown are from the July issue of 1977 and 1982. 
“ADV stands for the “advanced”  B727-200 model. 
bF’rice quote refers to 1978 rather than 1977 
“Price quote refers to 1981 rather than  1982. 
direct  price  quotations  are  available,  and  this  allows  the  study to include 
virtually the full range of models for which net revenue estimates have been 
compiled.  The fact that Avmark tends to underestimate the value of  newer 
models  implies that the use  of  Avmark  estimates tends correspondingly  to 
understate  the  quality  and/or efficiency  advantage  of  new  models  and  the 
associated relative price decline. 
Equation (4.7) suggests that,  at a given moment of  time in comparing a 
new model with an old model,  the ratio of  their used asset price should be 
equal to the ratio of their net revenue.  Table 4.13 displays pairwise model 
comparisons  of  net  revenue  and  used  price ratios.  In  the columns  labeled 
udul, the numbers in parentheses indicate used price comparisons in which 
both the numerator and denominator are price quotations as opposed to price 146  Chapter Four 
Table 4.13  Net Revenue and Used Price Ratios for “New”  and “Old”  Model 
Comparison Pairs 
Comparison 
1965  1972  1977  1982 
1.  A-300iL-1011 
2.  L-1011/DC8-61 
3.  DC-10iDC8-61 
4. 8-74716-707 
5.  DC8-61iDC8-50 
6. DC8-50iDC-7 
7.  DC9-80iB727-200 
8. B727-20018727-100 
9. 8727-100iL-188 
10.  B-720BL188 
1 1. L- 188iDC-6B 
12.  DC9-50iDCY-30 
1  3.  DCY -30iDC9- I0 









...  .. 
...  0.92 
...  1.46 
...  2.89 
...  1.85 
19.20*  ... 
...  1.76 
4.10*  ... 
4.00*  ... 
2.86  ... 
...  ... 
. . ,  1.67 
9.33*  ... 
...... 
...  1.44 
...  1.49 
...  4.97 
(2.91)  7.16 
...... 
1.85  3.08 
...... 
...... 
...  1.82 








...  (7.75) 





















Sources by column:  (1, 3, 5)  Table 4.9, col. 6. (2, 4, 6)  Table 4.12 
Note: Parentheses indicate that both components of the ratio are actual price quotations. An  asterisk indicates that the 
price quotation for the newer model is the1965 price of a new aircraft. See text. 
estimates, and numbers without parentheses indicate that both numerator and 
denominator are Avmark price estimates.12 A count of  table 4.13 indicates 
twenty-one cases in which a pairwise net revenue ratio can be compared with 
a used  asset price ratio (when both price quotations and Avmark estimates 
are available, only the ratio based on the former is counted). The unweighted 
average of the twenty-one used asset price ratios is 4.26, considerably higher 
than the 3.89 average for the twenty-one corresponding net revenue ratios. 
Excluding the extreme values for the comparison of  the DC8-50 and DC-7, 
with a used asset price ratio of  19.2 and a net revenue ratio of  20.57,  the 
respective averages are 3.52 and 3.06.  A  cross-sectional regression of  the 
twenty net revenue ratios (n) on the twenty used price ratios (u) yields the 
following: 
(4.8)  n  = 0.105  + 0.839u,  R2 = 0.556, SEE = 1.49, 
[O. 151  L4.981 
12. In comparisons for 1965 designated with an asterisk, no used price quotation is available 
for the newer model. In these cases, the price of the newer model is taken to be the price of that 
model sold new in 1965, from table 4.9. Recall that the data on new prices paid do not include 
engines, while the price quotations for used models do include engines. Assuming that engines 
contribute roughly 25 percent of the final total price of a new model, we implicitly treat the used 
price of  a new  model in  1965 as equal to  1.0011.25 = 0.8 of  the price of  the corresponding 
newly produced aircraft. This approach is supported by  a comment that appears in the Avmark 
Newslerrer  (July  1982,  2):  “These  prices  are  for  the  earlier  models,  with  newer  models 
approaching new aircraft prices in value.” 147  Commercial Aircraft 
where t-ratios are in brackets. There is a strong positive association between 
n and u, but the standard error of estimate is quite high. 
Several  speculations may  be  offered  to explain the  largest discrepancies 
between  the n and  the  u  ratios in  table 4.13. In the  first comparison,  that 
between  the  B-767 and the  L-1011, the  net  revenue  technique  registers  a 
relative  price  increase  of  35  percent,  while  the  used  price  comparison 
registers a relative price decrease of 49 percent. This comparison should not 
be given much weight, since there is no used price observation available for 
the brand-new 767  in  1982, and I use the price of  the new aircraft instead 
(see n. 13 below).  Most of the 767 aircraft sold in  1982 and  1983 were to 
airlines  that had  placed  orders  in  1978-79  when  expected  fuel  prices  for 
1982 were much higher than actual prices turned out to be. The relative price 
increase indicated by the net revenue calculation in column  3 suggests that 
the operating efficiency of  the 767 did not compensate for its high purchase 
price  at the  actual fuel prices of  1982. Airlines that might have  wanted  to 
back out of this transaction may have been prevented from canceling orders 
by stiff cancellation penalties. The makeshift device of comparing the price 
of the new 767 with the price of a used L- 10  1 1 may appear to be responsible 
for the problem,  but the same technique leads to a close correspondence of 
the net revenue ratio and the newiused price ratio in the 1965 comparisons of 
the DC8-50 and DC-7 and of the DC9-10 with the Convair 340/440. 
The net revenue technique appears to value the DC8-61 significantly more 
highly than does the used aircraft market.  This probably occurs because the 
net revenue approach treats the expected lifetime of all aircraft as identical in 
a given year, whereas the used aircraft market “knew”  that federal antinoise 
regulations  would  make the  DC8-61  obsolete  in  1985  without  expensive 
engine  “retrofitting”  (see  n.  12 above).  The net  revenue  technique  also 
appears to undervalue  the  B727-100 and  B720B  relative  to  the  Lockheed 
Electra (L-188), since the net revenue calculation is based strictly on profit 
potential and assumes that both new-model and old-model aircraft operate at 
the same load factor. This neglects the additional passenger comfort and time 
savings  made  possible  by  the  B727- 100  and  other  early-generation  jet 
aircraft that made the L-188 obsolete less than ten years after its introduction 
in  1958-59. 
The  treatment  of  used  aircraft  prices  incorporates  a  feature  that  may 
appear to be peculiar, and this is that depreciation is assumed to be purely 
economic, with no depreciation attributed to physical wear and tear or to the 
passage of  time.  Thus, prices  of  used  aircraft are compared  in tables 4.12 
and 4.13 without regard to their age. This would seem to create a bias when 
the used price ratios are interpreted as measuring the relative quality of new 
and old models of a given age, since part of the higher used price paid for 
the newer model must surely  include an allowance  for depreciation.  While 
plausible,  this  qualification  is not  likely to be  of  major  importance.  First, 
physical depreciation is much less important for aircraft than for automobiles 148  Chapter Four 
and trucks, both because of virtually continuous maintenance and because of 
the absence of direct contact with corrosive materials like road salt. Second, 
in  table 4.13,  we  have  successive  observations  on the used  aircraft  price 
ratios of new and old models of roughly the same age-B727-100  and early 
B727-200 aircraft  manufactured  in, respectively,  1964-67  and  1967-70, 
and DC9-10 and DC9-30 aircraft  manufactured  only a few years apart, in 
1966-68  and 1968-70.  While the newer model in these pairs was substan- 
tially  younger  in  1972, by  1982  the  newer  model  was  only  marginally 
younger (e.g., fourteen vs.  seventeen years). Thus, if physical depreciation 
had been important, we should have expected the price differential between 
the  newer  and the older model  to narrow,  but  in  fact  the  differential  was 
substantially wider for both  cases, supporting  the hypothesis that economic 
depreciation dominates  physical  depreciation.  Another  persuasive  example 
of  the importance of economic depreciation is the case of  the piston DC-7, 
since  aircraft  of  this  type  that  were  newly  manufactured  in  1958  were 
declared to be worth only scrap value just a year later.13 Some of the most 
dramatic implied relative price declines between old and new models were 
those involving the first-generation long-range jets, for example, the DC8-50 
and the B707- 100, and these aircraft replaced final-generation piston aircraft 
that in many cases were only two or three years older. 
4.7  Price Indexes Adjusted for Changes in Operating Efficiency 
Overall, it appears from the used price comparisons that the measures of 
relative price change between old and new models based on net revenue data 
may  be  too  conservative.  But,  by  not  allowing  at  all  for  physical 
depreciation, the measures of relative price change based on comparisons of 
used  aircraft prices may  be  too liberal,  and this  section develops real  and 
nominal  price indexes based on both  data sources.  Table 4.14 summarizes 
the ingredients in the calculation.  The various pairwise model comparisons 
are  listed  as  before  by  stage  length  and  are  allocated  to  chronological 
“generations.”  Several aircraft of a given  stage length are allocated to the 
same generation if  they were manufactured simultaneously for a substantial 
length  of  time,  as in  the  case of  the  B-747,  L-1011,  and  DC-10, but  to 
different generations if  the manufacture  of the older model  was terminated 
on the introduction of the newer model or soon thereafter. The newer model 
of each comparison is indicated in column 1, and column 2 lists other similar 
models  that  are  treated  as being  essentially  identical  for  the  purpose  of 
assigning  weights.  Relative  price  changes  between  old  and  new  models 
13.  Thus,  a  study  completed  in  February  1959 predicted  that,  by  the  end  of  1959,  a 
brand-new DC-7 would be  worth  only scrap value (see Sobotka  1959, table 6, p. 18). Other 
models predicted to reach scrap value by  1961 include the DC-3, DC-6, and all models of  the 
Lockheed Constellation (L-049, L-749, etc.). 149  Commercial Aircraft 
Table 4.14  Relative Price Changes and Weights Used in Calculating Quality-Adjusted 
Relative Price Index 
Generation  Other  Relative  Ratio of  Relative  Years of 
Number and  Models  Price Change  Used Aircraft  Price Change  Transition 
New Model  Included  (Tables 4.6-4.7)  Prices  from (4)  and Weight 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Long range: 
I. DC8-50 
2.  DC8-61 
3.  L1011-100 
DCIO-10 
8747-100 









1.  DC9-10 
2.  DC9-30 

















-  ,929 
~  ,586 
-  ,126 
~. 186 
-  .519 
,354 
-  ,560 
-  .599 
.065 
~  .286 
-  ,557 
-  ,758 
-  ,287 
-  .506 
















-  ,923 
-  ,761 
-  ,729 
~  ,722 
~  .652 
-  .49l 
-  ,236 
-.511 
-  ,745 
-  ,622 
-  ,546 
~  ,488 
-  ,726 
-  ,521 
-  .49l 
1959-60 






























I  .00 
1 .00 
1  .oo 
1 .00 
0.20 
Sources by  column; (1) Models shown are the “new  models”  chosen for the comparisons in tables 4.5 and 4.6. The 
“old models”  in each comparison are those displayed in tables 4.5 and 4.6.  (2) These models were treated as being 
essentially identical with the new models displayed in col.  1 for the purposes of establishing the weights for individual 
models shown in col.  6 and those for the long-range,  medium-range,  and short-range  classifications shown in table 
4.10. (3) These figures are from table 4.7, col. 2, for those comparisons where several years of alternative net revenue 
data are available. Figures for the other comparisons not shown in table 4.7 come from table 4.6, col. 8. (4) This is 
the ratio of the used aircraft price of the new model to the used aircraft price of the old model in the same comparison. 
In each case, the figure shown is the ratio of the price shown for each model in table 4.9, averaged over the years in 
that table where a price estimate or quotation for both models is available. For instance, table 4.9 shows that a price 
comparison for the A-300 with the L-1011 is available only for 1982, whereas a price ratio between the DC9-30 and 
DC9-I0 can be established for three years,  1972, 1977, and  1982. In those cases where both a price estimate and a 
price  quotation  are available for both  models  in  a  given  year,  the  quotation  is always  used  in  preference  to  the 
estimate. In several comparisons, the “new  model”  was so new that no price quote or estimate was available. In these 
cases,  the used price was estimated  as the new  aircraft price for that year (from table 4.6). Since the new aircraft 
prices do not include engines, allowing 25  percent of  the value of the airframe for engines would imply that these 
proxy prices are 80 percent of the price of the new aircraft. Used prices were estimated in this way for the following 
models and years: B-767 (1982), DC8-50 (19651, B727-100 (1965), B-720B (1965), and DC9-10 (1965). (5) This is 
calculated in the same way astable 4.6, col. 6, with the used aircraft price ratio in col. 4, u,/u,,  substituted for the net 
revenue ratio  n,/n,.  (6) The years of  transition are those used  in  table 4.  I1 to phase  in  the relative price changes 
shown in table 4.10. In each case, they are pairs of years, with the first chosen to be the initial year when significant 
deliveries  were  made  to  domestic  trunk  airlines.  Weights  were established  for  particular  aircraft  in  a  particular 
generation by taking its share of total sales in  the relevant category. Source for numbers of aircraft sold by  model is 
Aerospace Facts andFigures, issues dated 1961, 1969, 1974/75, and 1981/82. Source for average price of each model 
is the set of  worksheets underlying table 4.2. 
‘The  extreme value for 1982 is omitted. 150  Chapter Four 
implied  by  the  net  revenue  ratios  and  used  price  ratios  are  indicated  in 
columns 3 and 5, respectively. 
The task of converting the relative price changes in columns 3 and 5 into 
Tomqvist price  indexes  is carried out in two steps, the first of  which  is to 
determine weighted average relative price changes within the three length-of- 
haul categories, and the second of which determines the weighted average of 
these three  sets of  price  changes. The first  step allocates the relative price 
changes between old and new models to pairs of “transition  years,”chosen as 
the  first  two  years  of  production  of  the  new  model.  The choice of  two 
transition years, rather than one, helps smooth the final price index and also 
takes account of the fact that production may continue on the last few aircraft 
in an older generation after production has started on the first aircraft in the 
new  generation.  Then  a  weight,  based  on  the  value  of  production,  is 
determined  for each model  within  its  “generation”  of  long-haul, medium- 
haul, or short-haul aircraft. In  several  cases, this  is straightforward,  since 
there was only a single model in a given generation, and it can be allocated 
a weight of  100 percent. In  other cases, there are several models within  a 
given generation, as for the third generation of long-haul aircraft comprising 
the L-1011, DC-10, and B-747, and weights based on the value of production 
are determined by the share of each aircraft in the total production run of its 
generation (1970-77  for long-haul generation 3, and 1961  -66  for medium- 
haul generation  2). When a previous  generation remains in production,  the 
weights on the next generation do not sum to 100 percent, as in the case of the 
short-range DC9-30  and  B737-200,  which  were  produced  simultaneously 
along with the newer DC9-50, and the long-range B707-100 and B707-300, 
which remained in production  along with the stretched DC8-61. 
The weights shown in column 6 of table 4.14 then determine the relative 
price  change  within  each  length-of-haul  category  for  each  year.  As  an 
example, the “third generation” DC9-50 is allocated a weight of 20 percent 
in the short-haul category. The relative price change between the second and 
the third generations based on net revenue data from table 4.9 is indicated as 
-  50.6 percent in column 3. Thus, the price change on the net revenue basis 
for the short-haul category in the two transition years  1978-79  is calculated 
as (- .506)(.2)(.5), which equals  -5.06  percent. On the used price basis, 
the  relative  price  change  in  column  5  is  indicated  as  -49.1  percent, 
implying  a  corresponding  price  change  in  the  short-haul  category  for 
1978-79  of  -4.91  percent.  In  years  between  transition  years  for each 
category,  the  relative  price  change  is  set  equal  to  zero.  Thus,  in  the 
short-haul category,  the  relative  price  change on  the net  revenue  basis  is 
calculated  as -  37.9 percent  for 1966-67,  -  14.35 percent  for  1968-69, 
-5.06  percent for 1978-79,  and zero for all other years between  1958 and 
1983. Since no data are available to make model comparisons  on either the 
net revenue or the used price basis before  1958, assume zero relative price 
change in all three categories for the period  1947-57. 151  Commercial Aircraft 
Table 4.15  Two “Real”  Price Indexes for Commercial Aircraft and Weights by  Category, 
1957-83 
Value Weights (Percent)  Real Price Indexes 
Long  Medium  Short  Net Revenue  Used Price 
Range  Range  Range  Basis  Basis 
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Sources  by column:  (1-3)  Same as table 4.10, col. 6. (4) Relative price changes from table 4.10, col. 3, 
phased in during the transition years shown in table 4.10,col. 6, using the weights shown in the same column. 
(5) Same as col. 4, using relative price changes from table 4.1  1, col. 5. 
The second step is to convert these relative price changes within the three 
length-of-haul categories into two aggregate real price indexes, one on the 
net revenue basis and one on  the  used  price basis.  Weights based  on the 
value of production for each of the three categories are exhibited in the first 
three  columns  of  table  4.15.14  These  weights  are  used  to  combine  the 
relative price changes for the three length-of-haul categories into the two 
Tornqvist indexes displayed in columns 4 and 5 of table 4.15. As we might 
expect,  the  most  rapid  decline  in  both  real  price  indexes  occurred  in 
1958-60,  as a result of the replacement of the piston DC-6 and DC-7 series 
by  the turboprop Lockheed Electra (L-188) and the pure jet Boeing 707 and 
14. Sources for the value of  production are the same as those listed in the notes to col. 6 of 
table 4.14. 152  Chapter Four 
720,  and the Douglas  DC-8.  Both  indexes  also decline rapidly  during  the 
period of the introduction of  the first short-haul jet airliner, the DC9-10, in 
1966-67,  and  the  introduction  of  the  stretched  DC8-61,  B727-200,  and 
DC9-30 in 1967-69.  There is little further decline in the net revenue index, 
while there is a substantial further decline after 1970 in the index based on 
used  aircraft  price  ratios.  This  discrepancy  reflects  the  greater  quality 
differential attributed by the used price method to the long-range DC- 10 and 
L-1011.  An  even  greater  discrepancy  occurs  between  1963  and  1966, 
because the used price method rates the medium-range  B727-100 as much 
higher  in quality  than  the L-188 that  it replaced,  whereas the net revenue 
method  places no  value  on  passenger  time  or comfort  and treats  the two 
aircraft as comparable. The fact that the L-188 was retired from trunk airline 
service by  the late 1960s, whereas several hundred B727-100 aircraft were 
still in trunk airline service in  1985, suggests that the net revenue method is 
too conservative in this example. A straightforward  way to summarize the 
two different real price indexes is to display their annual percentage rates of 
growth before and after 1972: 
Net Revenue Basis  Used Price Basis 
1957-72  - 
1972-83 
12.8 
~  2.2 
-  16.6 
-3.8 
Table 4.16 (as well as Fig. 4.1) displays four nominal price  indexes for 
commercial aircraft. The SMSA and BEA indexes are copied from table 4.3 
and refer to identical models, with no attempt to measure the price change 
that occurs when one model  is replaced  by  another. The two new  indexes 
consist of  the SMSA index for identical models multiplied by  the two real 
price indexes from table 4.15, one on the net revenue basis and one on the 
used price basis, that measure the change in price between one model and its 
replacement.  Overall,  the  two  new  indexes  provide  a  radically  different 
verdict  on  price  changes  in  the  commercial  aircraft  industry  than  do the 
SMSA and BEA  indexes,  which  implicitly  ignore  nonproportional quality 
change between old and new models. The difference between the SMSA and 
the  BEA  indexes  appears  to  be  minor  when  compared  to  the  enormous 
contrast  with  the  two  new  indexes,  and  between  the  two  new  indexes 
themselves. 
4.8  Conclusion 
A review of the estimation procedures suggests little reason to doubt the 
overall implications of the index based on used aircraft price ratios, although 153  Commercial Aircraft 
Table 4.16  Nominal Price Indexes for Identical Models and After Adjustment for Quality 
Change (1972 = 100) 
Net Index  New Index 
SMSA  BEA  Net Revenue  Used Price 
Index  Index  Basis  Basis 


























































































































































































Sources by  column:  (1-2)  Table 4.3, cols. 2 and 3. (3-4)  Table 4.3, col.  1, times table 4. I I, cols. 4 and  5. 
there is obviously  a margin of error in the sense that different data sources 
and  different  choices of  weights  and  transition  years  would  influence  the 
final price index. But it is hard to “argue with the market,”  especially with 
the basic fact that the used price ratio of new to old models is much higher 
than the ratio of their prices when new. And the fact that these ratios of used 
aircraft prices widened rather than narrowed over time, despite the narrowing 154  Chapter Four 
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Fig. 4.1  Indexes of new aircraft prices, 1972 = 100 
relative difference between the ages of the new and the old models, suggests 
that  economic  depreciation  dominates  any minor  effect  of  physical  depre- 
ciation in the used aircraft market. 
As  for the net revenue ratios, they are more likely to be too conservative, 
in  the  sense  of  attributing  too  little  rather  than  too  much  net  revenue 
advantage to the newer models and thus understating the rate of relative price 
decline.  As  several  of  the  examples  above  suggested,  the net  revenue 
method  understates  the  advantage  of  new  models  by  placing  no  value  on 
passenger time or comfort, and by assuming that the expected lifetime of all 
models  is  the  same.  Likewise,  no  value  is  placed  on  intangibles  like 
reliability,  in  contrast to the market contrast  in reliability  of  piston  and jet 
aircraft  suggested  by  the  following  quote:  “In  the  piston  era, experience 
showed  a  dual  engine failure  rate  of  one per  8  million  operating  hours, 
compared  with  a  ‘probability  rate’  of  one  per  1  billion  hours  for  jet 
transports.  There is so far no recorded instance of  such a dual failure in 25 
years of jet operations”  (Aviation Week and Space Technology, 17 December 
1984, 24).’’  Yet speed, comfort, and reliability can all be valued by the used 
aircraft market, and on average the ratios of used aircraft prices between new 
and old models are greater than the corresponding net revenue ratios. 
15. Another  achievement of  modern jet technology  has  been  witnessed  as two-engine jet 
aircraft have been allowed to fly the North Atlantic. As reliability has been proven, the rules for 
the  number  of  minutes  these  aircraft  can  remain  away  from  the  closest  airport  have  been 
extended.  As  of  mid-1989.  there  has  been  no  single  instance  of  an  engine  failure  on  a 
two-engine jet aircraft since such flying began in 1985. 155  Commercial Aircraft 
Table 4.17  Comparison of Growth Rates of  Various Indexes of Prices and Employee 
Compensations,  in Annual Percentage Growth Rates 
1941 -  12  1912-83 
1. Compensation per €TE  employee  6.3  8.6 
2.  BEA price index  3.5  8.8 
3. New index net revenue basis (NRB)  -5.6  5.2 
4.  New index used price basis (UPB)  -7.1  4.3 
5.  Addenda: Comparison-BEA  2.8  -0.2 
6. Addenda: Comparison-NRB  11.9  3.4 
7.  Addenda: Comparison-UPB  14.0  4.3 
Sources:  Rows 1-4  from table 4.16. Rows 5-7  from table 4.1. 
One subtle source of error may create a further presumption  that the net 
revenue  technique  understates  the  advantage  of  new  models.  Consider  the 
amazingly high  ratios of net revenue  to aircraft price  arrayed  in  table 4.8, 
column 4, ranging as high as 60 percent.  This is far higher than  the likely 
cost of capital and makes us wonder  why the airline industry has not been 
more profitable.  One possibility is that the approach used in tables 4.8 and 
4.9  may  systematically  overstate  revenue  or  understate  costs,  leading  to 
exaggerated estimates of net revenue. If this tendency were corrected, all net 
revenue figures  would  be  squeezed, and  the  older planes would be pushed 
closer to break-even status, thus increasing the relative net-revenue advantage 
of  the  newer  models.  Another  important  source  of  conservatism  in  the 
estimates  is the  decision  to use the  same utilization rates for new  and  old 
models. The actual utilization  rates for piston aircraft were uniformly lower 
than for jets, allowing them to earn even less net revenue than indicated in 
my calculations. One hopeful note is that the net revenue earned on the older 
models declines over time and becomes negative at roughly the date when 
these  aircraft  were  retired  from U.S. trunkline  service, for example,  the 
estimated net revenue of the B707-300 becomes negative in  1982, about the 
same  time  that  this  model  was  phased  out  by  the  last  airlines  using  it 
(American and TWA) in 1981-83. 
This  chapter  began  with  the  working  hypothesis  that  the  official  BEA 
index for equipment cost overstates aircraft price increases more before 1972 
than afterward, leading to a corresponding understatement of the growth rate 
of  real  equipment  investment  and  the  real  capital  stock  of  aircraft.  The 
observed  post-1972  slowdown  in  the  growth  of  labor productivity  in  the 
airline industry thus might be partly explained by a slowdown in the growth 
rate of capital input that is greater than is implied by official equipment price 
indexes.  The  chapter  supports the  hypothesis  and  yields  two  new  price 
indexes  for  aircraft  that  decline  in  nominal  terms  before  1972  and  rise 
thereafter.  An  interesting  contrast  is  provided  by  the juxtaposition  of  the 
growth rates of the various price  indexes from table 4.16 with the growth 
rate of employee  compensation  from table 4.1, listed  in table 4.17.  Thus, 156  Chapter Four 
according to either of the new indexes, the incentive to substitute capital for 
labor  was  much  greater  before  1972 than  afterward,  and  the  BEA  index 
understates  this  post-1972  shift  by  a  wide  margin.  It  remains  to be  seen 
whether studies of other major capital goods indicate a similar tendency for a 
greater overstatement of  price increases prior to 1972 than afterward. 
To  the  extent  that  this  study  “explains”  the  slowdown  in  productivity 
growth  in  the  airline  industry  by  the  mismeasurement  of  nonproportional 
quality change in the production  of  aircraft,  it just shifts the puzzle of  the 
productivity slowdown back one industry from airlines to aircraft manufac- 
turing.  At the beginning of this  chapter, I suggested that,  if profit margins 
were constant,  then the difference in the growth rates of  compensation per 
employee  and  in  equipment  cost  could  serve  as a  proxy  for  productivity 
growth in the aircraft manufacturing  industry.  As shown by  table 4.17, the 
difference between  compensation per employee and the two new equipment 
price indexes (NRB and UPB) is much greater than for the BEA equipment 
price index.  This difference decelerated after  1972 by 8.5 points  according 
to  the  NRB  index  and  by  9.7  points  according  to  the  UPB  index,  as 
contrasted to a slowdown  of  3.0 points  according  to the  BEA  index.  The 
leading hypothesis to explain this slowdown in the rate of  nonproportional 
quality  improvements  is  Nordhaus’s  (1982)  “depletion  hypothesis.”  The 
aircraft airframe and engine  industry had  no  “bag  of  tricks”  to match the 
discovery of the jet engine and the swept-back wing, and many of the quality 
improvements made after  1960 took the form of  making aircraft larger. But 
the  limit  was  reached  with  the  Boeing  747 and Douglas  DC-10, and  it is 
likely  that  we  will  be  traveling  in  those  aircraft  (or  slightly  improved 
versions thereof) well into the twenty-first century. 